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Affirmative Action as Government Speech
William M. Carter, Jr.
ABSTRACT
This Article seeks to transform how we think about affirmative action. The U.S.
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject may appear to be a seamless whole, but
closer examination reveals crucial differences between the cases broadly characterized as
involving affirmative action. The government sometimes acts in a race-conscious manner
by granting a tangible benefit to members of a minority group for remedial or diversifying
purposes. But the government may also undertake remedial or diversifying race-conscious
action without it resulting in unequal treatment or disadvantage to nonminorities.
Under the Court's current equal protection doctrine, both situations are presumptively
unconstitutional. Race consciousness itself has become a constitutional harm, regardless
of its tangible effects.
This Article breaks new ground by arguing that, functionally, the Court has come to
view race-conscious government action as a form of prohibited government speech. The
Court's colorblindness doctrine, which is premised on expressive harm, is fundamentally
inconsistent with the rationales for the government speech doctrine under the First
Amendment. As the government speech doctrine recognizes, disagreement with the
message sent by government action is not alone sufficient to state a constitutional claim.
Rather, such disagreement is best addressed through the political process. This Article
argues that the Court should use government speech principles to inform its equal
protection analysis in cases in which the alleged harm is primarily expressive in nature.
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A government entity has the right to speak for itself. It is
entitled . . . to select the views that it wants to express. Indeed, it
is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked
this freedom.'
Government action dividing us by race ... promote[s] notions
of racial inferiority[,] reinforce[s] the belief... that individuals
should be judged by the color of their skin, endorse[s] race-based
reasoning [and] demeans the dignity and worth of a person . . .

INTRODUCTION
America is no longer legally divided by race. But Americans remain
divided about race. Many believe that we have entered a postracial' era
in which discrimination against racial minorities is largely a thing of the past.4
The continued subordinate status5 of racial minorities is therefore commonly
attributed to other factors, such as class disparities, differences in culture, or
lack of individual effort.' Conversely, others believe that a significant portion
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (alteration
in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-RacialEqualProtection?,
98 GEO. L.J. 967, 968 (2010) (describing "post-racialism" as "a set of beliefs that coalesce to
posit that racial discrimination is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by America's and
Americans' pronounced racial progress"); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589,
1594 (2009) (describing postracialism as the "belief that due to the significant racial progress
that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt racebased remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of
social action").
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 919 (2009)
(citing polling data to show that "an abundance of statistical data consistently demonstrates
that persons of color tend to believe that racism remains a substantial barrier to their social and
economic advancement, while whites tend to dismiss racial status as a contemporary marker of
disadvantage and privilege"). Indeed, many Americans also believe that discrimination against
whites is now as significant a problem as discrimination against racial minorities. See, e.g.,
Charles
M. Blow, Let's Rescue the Race Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, graph at A19 (citing
polling data from a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute in which 48 percent of
whites, but only 30 percent of blacks and 32 percent of Hispanics, agreed with the statement
that "discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks
and other minorities").
See, e.g., Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 3, at 982-92 (surveying the statistical data
showing continued racial disparities in the areas of income, wealth, education, housing,
employment, and the criminal justice system); R.A. Lenhardt, Understandingthe Mark: Race,
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 806-07 (2004) (same).
Hutchinson, supra note 4, at 919.
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of racial inequality is due to contemporary racial discrimination and the present
effects of official and unofficial past discrimination These individuals, therefore,
tend to be substantially less sanguine that we have achieved a postracial society.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions embrace the philosophy of postracialism, which carries the doctrinal corollary of government colorblindness
as the primary command of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.' If race is no longer the problem, then race-conscious government
action can no longer be the solution. Such action, adherents of the colorblind
Constitution suggest, both punishes "innocent whites" and addresses the wrong
problem. 9 Under this doctrine, race-conscious government action is presumptively unconstitutional regardless of whether it aims to aid or injure historically
subordinated minority groups.'0 The Court has accordingly struck down a
variety of programs broadly characterized as affirmative action because such
programs are race conscious."
Characterizing all instances of government race consciousness as affirmative action, however, elides the difference between government action having
redistributive purposes and effects and that which does not. Certain government
programs consider minority status to be a positive factor in allocating a limited

7.

Id

8.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

9.

See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives'Passionfor the Unattainable,94 VA. L. REV. 495,
516 (2008) ('The [Supreme] Court's treatment of affirmative action policies designed to remedy past
employment discrimination is a striking illustration of the judicial determination-shared by much of
society-to protect innocent whites from any loss in the race remediation process." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g.,Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every
context, even for so-called 'benign' racial classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions
policies, race-based preferences in government contracts, and race-based districting intended to
improve minority representation." (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (incorporating equal protection doctrine to find
that a city's efforts to avoid racially disparate impact in promotions violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007) (striking down school districts' race-conscious efforts to prevent resegregation of
public schools); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (holding that an undergraduate
university violated equal protection because it considered applicants' race mechanistically, rather than
as an "individualized" factor, in admissions decisions); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applied to a federal program designed to increase
participation of underrepresented minority businesses in federal contracts); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 657-58 (1993) (holding that strict scrutiny applied to a state redistricting plan that created a
majority black voting district in order to avoid dilution of black voting strength); City of Richmond
v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (declaring unconstitutional a city's program that
designated a portion of the city's construction funds for minority-owned firms); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (plurality opinion) (striking down University of
California--Davis Medical School's admissions program under which a set number of slots were
reserved for applicants from underrepresented minority groups).

10.

11.
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government resource, such as government contracts or admission to state
universities. For example, the federal government may offer financial incentives to
federal contractors who hire minority-owned subcontractors, in order to increase
diversity among its suppliers and to remedy the lingering effects of racially
exclusionary business practices.12 Under such a program, nonminority subcontractors
do not benefit from such financial incentives. Similarly, a state university may
consider the fact that an applicant is a member of an underrepresented minority
group to be a positive factor in the admission process," with the result that an
otherwise similarly situated nonminority applicant may be rejected. In these
scenarios, the distribution of a limited resource is determined in part by race.
Thus, one can coherently (although, in my view, incorrectly) argue that such
programs violate equal protection because they unequally distribute benefits on
irrelevant grounds or for insufficiently weighty reasons.' 4 Conversely, one could
reasonably conclude that government inaction in the face of known racial
inequality unconstitutionally perpetuates that inequality."
This Article does not seek to directly critique the Court's cases involving
such traditional affirmative action measures. Rather, this Article disaggregates
the cases to reveal a new understanding under which government race consciousness by itself need not be seen as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Government action can be (and often is) race conscious without creating
differential treatment or imposing a substantial tangible disadvantage on
nonminorities. For example, a legislature may redraw voting districts to maximize minority voting strength that would otherwise be diluted by virtue of the
existing district form without imposing any corresponding voting disadvantage

12.
13.

14.

15.

See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-10 (describing the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions).
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315-16 (2003) (describing University of Michigan
Law School's policy that considered race as one of a number of variables in admissions decisions);
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255-56 (describing University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policies
under which applicants belonging to underrepresented minority groups received additional
points on admissions scale).
See, e.g.,Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[T]here is a moral [and] constitutional equivalence between laws designed to subjugate a race
and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of
equality." (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, it can be argued that even in the redistributive context, speaking of affirmative action as
conferring benefits and disadvantages obscures preexisting inequalities. Thus, a redistributive
program can be seen as leveling the playing field to correct for embedded advantages and disadvantages already conferred in a racially unequal manner due to contemporary and past discrimination.
While I agree with this perspective, this Article seeks to illuminate the differences between objections
to government programs that employ race in a way that reallocates resources and objections to
race-conscious government action that are premised primarily on notions of expressive harm.
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on nonminority voters.1 6 Similarly, a school district may seek to achieve or
maintain racial integration through the use of race-conscious student assignment
plans, under which the race of all students is equally considered and all
students receive a spot in the public schools." Likewise, a city may act in a
race-conscious manner by suspending all promotions until they can be made
in a manner that does not needlessly exclude minority applicants." These
situations all differ from traditional affirmative action in that they do not
distribute a limited resource in a race-conscious manner. The objection to
such programs therefore cannot be that one person received something that
another did not because of race. Rather, the objection is to government race
consciousness itself and the message sent thereby.' 9
The Court's colorblindness jurisprudence, by deploying the same legal
rhetoric and doctrine to examine these different situations, wrongly treats these
two categories of cases as constitutionally equivalent. The doctrine in effect
means that the government presumptively violates the Constitution whenever
its actions convey the message that race still matters in our society.
The colorblindness doctrine is inconsistent with the Court's doctrine in
other areas. First, in cases involving alleged dignitary or expressive harms to
racial minorities, the Court has consistently held that such harms do not,
standing alone, violate the Equal Protection Clause or even warrant heightened
judicial scrutiny.20 Second, the Court's colorblindness doctrine is inconsistent
with the rationales underlying the government speech doctrine of the First
Amendment. Under the government speech doctrine, a government entity is
not required to remain neutral when it expresses its own views. 2' This Article
argues that the Court is functionally analyzing race-conscious government
action as the expression of a message. Rather than purporting to treat such
messages as denials of equal treatment, the Court should instead use government
speech principles to inform its equal protection analysis in such cases.

16.

17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657-58 (holding that strict scrutiny applied to a state legislature's decision
to create a majority black voting district). The fact that minority voters would have a better
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice cannot be seen as a "disadvantage" to nonminoity
voters unless nonminorities' votes are somehow diluted, which was not the case in Shaw. See infra
notes 49-63 and accompanying text (discussing Shaw).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711-12 (2007)
(striking down race-conscious voluntary school integration plans).
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
The lack of a tangible injury raises the question of whether the plaintiffs in such cases should even
have standing to sue. This Article addresses the issue of standing as it relates to expressive harms
and the colorblindness doctrine in Part IV, infra.
See infra Part II for a discussion of such cases.
See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the government speech doctrine.
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This Article distinguishes the expressive harms of government race consciousness from tangible harms such as differential treatment in the distribution
of a limited resource. To be sure, the law recognizes expressive harms as injuries
in a variety of contexts, for example under the First Amendmenfs Establishment
and Free Speech Clauses and in the law of defamation. Thus, when speaking
of race consciousness as an expressive harm, this Article does not use that term
pejoratively to connote the lack of any effect. Rather, the effect is one that is
psychological or dignitary.22 Where the harm alleged from government race consciousness is primarily expressive and nonsubordinating (that is, it does not
result in differential treatment, racialized distribution of a limited resource, or
racial stigmatization to any appreciable degree), this Article argues that First
Amendment principles can be helpful in assessing whether the expression
amounts to a constitutional injury.23
Part I of this Article examines the Court's strict colorblindness cases and
reveals that the Court's reasoning in such cases revolves around a narrative
condemning the message such action expresses. Part II demonstrates that only
recently has the Court held that race-conscious government action violates the
Equal Protection Clause regardless of tangible harm or unequal treatment. In
earlier equal protection cases involving expressive harms to racial minorities, the
Court consistently rejected such claims unless they were accompanied by
unequal treatment, stigma, or some significant tangible harm. Part III explains
the government speech doctrine and argues that the Court should employ
First Amendment principles to inform its analysis in the colorblindness cases.
Part Ill also articulates limitations on this theory of race consciousness as government speech. Part IV explains the benefits of applying the speech paradigm to
race-conscious government action, including that it would be intellectually
honest, consistent with the Court's borrowing of equal protection concepts in
free speech cases, and more likely to result in such programs being upheld.
This Article concludes with a call for epistemic modesty by the Court. The
Court should not lightly disregard the judgment of democratically accountable
actors that race consciousness sometimes remains necessary to overcome persistent

22.

23.

Cf Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories ofLaw:A GeneralRestatement,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1527 (2000) (stating that "[a] person suffers expressive harm when she is
treated according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her").
1 do not here address whether hate speech should be protected by the Frst Amendment, although I
acknowledge that the harm of hate speech is often primarily expressive.
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racial inequality. At a minimum, it should inform its theory of expressive
harm in the strict colorblindness cases with traditional First Amendment
principles to allow democratic space for competing messages regarding the continued salience of race.
I.

THE EXPRESSIVE HARM THEORY
OF THE COLORBLINDNESS DOCTRINE

In his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson," Justice Harlan declared
that "[o]ur [Clonstitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." 25 The Court's contemporary equal protection doctrine
purports to take this statement literally and holds that any governmental use
of race is presumptively unconstitutional. Several justifications are offered
for the colorblindness doctrine. First, supporters of the doctrine argue that the
doctrine is driven by constitutional text: The words "equal protection" mean
that the government must provide formal equal treatment to all individuals,
regardless of purpose or underlying differences in circumstances. 26 Second,
proponents of the colorblindness doctrine purport to rely on the moral force of
constitutional history. The colorblindness doctrine, according to this argument,
is the culmination of the hard-fought battle to ensure race neutrality in the law.
Absolute government neutrality on issues of race, it is argued, was what Justice
Harlan advocated in Plessy,27 what civil rights lawyers and activists urged in the

24.
25.
26.

27.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating, in a case striking down voluntary school integration plans, that
"[i]n place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent would permit measures to keep the races
together and proscribe measures to keep the races apart. .. [and that] no such distinction is apparent
in the Fourteenth Amendment"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 526 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("The command of the equal protection guarantee is simple but unequivocal. In the
words of the Fourteenth Amendment 'No State shall . . .deny to any person . . . the equal protection
of the laws.' Nothing in this language singles out some 'persons' for more 'equal' treatment than
others." (emphasis in original)); John Marquez Lundin, The Callfora Color-BlindLaw,30 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 407, 441 (1997) (arguing that the text of the Equal Protection Clause supports
the colorblindness doctrine because "it is perfectly dear from the text that the rights granted by the
amendments are general and unqualified [and that t]here is thus no textual support for the argument
that these rights apply differently to people of different races").
See, e.g., ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("My view of the Constitution
is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy: 'Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.').
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59 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2011)

1950s and 1960s," and what ultimately came to be the law of the land in
Brown v. Board ofEducation.29

Legal scholars have criticized these justifications for the colorblindness
doctrine as lacking support in the text" or the original intent" of the post-Civil
War constitutional amendments. Critics also charge that the colorblindness
doctrine misreads Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy,32 the arguments of civil
28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

See, e.g., id at 747 (plurality opinion) (quoting, as support for the colorblindness doctrine, the
statement of counsel Robert Carter at oral argument in Brown that "[w]e have one fundamental
contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is
that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens").
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 ('In Brown v. BoardofEducation,
we held that segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities . ... It was not
the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on
which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954." (citations omitted)).
As Justice Scalia noted, the bare text of most constitutional provisions cannot answer most
interpretive questions. 'In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the
Constitution tells us .. . to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation-though not an interpretation that the language will not bear." ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37 (1997). To posit
that the words "equal protection of the law" always, only, and ineluctably mean formal equal
treatment requires divorcing those words from the context in which they were written. But even
putting aside context for the moment, the text itself does not conclusively answer the pertinent
question. It is, after all, the Equal Protection Clause, not the Equal Treatment Clause. Had the
Reconstruction Framers meant to require only formal governmental "treatment," they presumably
would have chosen to use that word in the text. Moreover, the word they did use"protection"-implies, inter alia, "[t]hat which. . .preserves from injury." WEBSTER'S AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828), availableathttp://1828.mshaffer.com.
Under this reading, the government could therefore seek to "protect" rational minorities "equally"
by enacting laws to prevent or remedy the harms that fall on them particularly and that would
remain unredressed absent government action.
See, e.g., ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 829 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing an array of race-conscious
remedial programs enacted during Reconstruction for the proposition that "those who drafted [the
Fourteenth] Amendment... would have understood the legal and practical difference between
the use of race-conscious criteria. .. to keep the races apart, and the use of race-conscious
criteria... to bring the races together"); Christopher W. Schmidt, Listening to History? Parents
Involved, Brown, and the Colorblind Constitution, Legal Workshop (Apr. 30, 2009), based on
Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 206
(2008) (arguing that the colorblindness doctrine has "little basis in the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment [and that t]he legislators who in 1866 drafted the Amendment also passed
distinctly color-conscious legislation designed to help the newly freed slaves"); see also lan F. Haney
L6pez, "A Nation ofMinorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV.
985, 993 (2007) ("[T]he Congress which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted numerous laws specifically benefiting blacks.").
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critiqueof"Our ConstitutionlIsColor-Blind,"44 STAN. L. REV. 1,39 (1991)
(characterizing Justice Harlan's dissent as "rejecting the majority's view that racial segregation is
unconnected to oppression" and "refusing to adopt the [majority's] rigid legalism"); Cedric Merlin
Powell, Blinded by Color The New EqualProtection, the Second Deconstruction, andAf rmative Inaction,
51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 203 (1998) ('The theoretical allure of colorblindness begins with an
acontextual examination of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy no mention is made of Justice Harlan's
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rights activists,33 and the Court's decision in Brown.34 Some scholars further
contend that the Court's colorblindness doctrine is really an ideology serving
to ratify and perpetuate existing racial hierarchies. 35 This Article does not
attempt to resolve these debates. Rather, this Article argues that the contemporary colorblindness doctrine is best understood as the Court condemning
certain government messages that contradict postracialism.
Members of the Court have explicitly invoked a theory of expressive harm
in striking down remedial or diversifying government action even where no
tangible harm occurred. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,36 for example, the Court held that two school districts'

voluntary efforts to maintain public school integration violated the Equal
Protection Clause. In ParentsInvolved, the Seattle and Louisville school districts
sought to prevent de facto segregation by adopting plans that took account of
race, among other factors, in assigning students to particular schools.
Although the plans differed somewhat, both districts sought to ensure that
the racial composition of any given school fell within a broad range of the

33.

34.

35.

36.

concern with racial subordination [and] no reference is made to how the concept of race shaped his
vision of constitutional equality .... ).
See, e.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
203, 238 (2008) ("Even if the NAACP. . .briefs in Brown led with calls for a colorblind interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the bulk of these briefs were dedicated to demonstrating
the dangers of a racial caste system and the harms of segregated schools to children.. . .To now
portray the NAACP as embracing one claim to the exclusion of the other distorts the historical
record.").
See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination andAnticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1481-83 (2004) (noting that Brown's reasoning
rested on the harms of segregation in public schools, not the condemnation of all racial classifications
as per se unconstitutional because, inter alia, the Supreme Court was not yet prepared to embrace the
implications that a strict colorblindness principle would have had for a variety of other laws, including
antimiscegenation statutes).
Professor Siegel, for example, suggests that the current state of equal protection doctrine can be seen
as "preservation-through-transformation." Reva Siegel, Whby Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing StateAction, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) (citing
Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love" Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE LJ. 2117,
2178-87 (1996)). When a prior legal regime for maintaining racial hierarchies becomes discredited
(for example, Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine), a new rhetoric is developed (for example,
colorblindness) that formally disavows that prior regime. The rhetorical or doctrinal distancing from
the old regime creates a narrative of progress, which masks the fact that substantive change may be
much more limited than the new rhetoric or doctrine suggests. See generally id at 1113-14; cf
Gotanda, supra note 32, at 2 (1991) ("[The United States Supreme Court's use of color-blind
constitutionalism-a collection of legal themes fuinctioning as a racial ideology-fosters white
racial domination.").
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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districts' overall racial composition." If a student's assignment to particular
school would cause its racial composition to exceed the relevant guidelines, the
student would be assigned to a different school. Parents in both districts sued,
alleging that the plans violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court, in a
plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts and a separate concurring opinion
by Justice Kennedy, found the plans unconstitutional.
The Court's reasoning in Parents Involved was based entirely on notions of
expressive harm." The plurality condemned such programs as "demean[ing]"39
the individuals subject to them, because they "promote[d]," 40 "reinforce[d]," 4 1 and
"endorse[d]"42 race consciousness. The plurality firther stated that government race
consciousness inevitably causes hostility, contributes to stereotypes regarding
racial inferiority, and reinforces the idea that individuals should be "judged by
ancestry instead of by [their] own merit and essential qualities."43 Of these concerns, the first two, hostility and stereotypes, are clearly expressive in nature. The
final rationale involves a rhetorical sleight of hand. School integration plans cannot
judge schoolchildren based on their race. Because public school assignments are
not based on merit, no judgment of an individual's abilities or worth is involved in
making such assignments. What the plurality found objectionable therefore could
not have been that the plans at issue themselves involved a race-based judgment,
but instead that, through their expressive content, such plans reinforce the perception that race still matters. Whether the government action reinforced certain
messages, then, was at the core of the plurality's concerns.
Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote for the outcome in Parents
Involved, even more explicitly relied on a theory of expressive harm in his
37.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Of particular importance to both the plurality and to Justice Kennedy in ParentsInvolvedwas the fact
that each district's guidelines defined the diversity it sought to maintain by reference to the categories
"white/non-white" (in Seattle) and "black/other" (in Louisville). Id at 727. These justices considered this to be proof that the plans were not narrowly tailored to achieve racial diversity:
The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the
asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of
the respective school districts-or rather the white/nonwhite or black/other balance
of the districts, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
An expressive harm can be defined as an alleged harm that "results from the ideas or attitudes
expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences that action brings about." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
'Bizarre Districts,"and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno,

92 MIcH. L. REV. 483, 506 (1993).
551 U.S. at 727.
Idat 746.
Id
Id
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
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concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's position that
achieving or maintaining racial integration in the public schools can never be a
compelling interest in its own right." However, he voted with the plurality to
strike down the plans at issue because they explicitly sent a racial message by
their use of express racial categories to determine student assignments. According
to Justice Kennedy, "[G]overnmental classifications that command people to
march in different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness .... On the other hand, race-conscious measures that do not rely on
differential treatment based on [express] individual classifications present these
problems to a lesser degree."4 5 Justice Kennedy accordingly stated that a school
integration plan that was indisputably race conscious but facially race neutral
should not even trigger strict scrutiny
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of
diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources
for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by
race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different
treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to
be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict
scrutiny to be found permissible. 46
For Justice Kennedy, then, we are allowed to see the elephant in the room
but not to speak of it. This approach is the apotheosis of race as speech: An
41
expressive harm cannot be inflicted if no message is expressed. In sum, the true

44.

45.
46.
47.

The plurality held that maintaining or achieving racial diversity for its own sake is only a compelling government interest when a school district is seeking to eliminate the present effects of de
jure segregation. See id. at 720-21 (noting that neither district was currently subject to a judicial
finding of maintaining de jure segregation and therefore could not rely on remedying the effects of
de jure segregation as a compelling interest). Justice Kennedy and the dissenting Justices disagreed,
finding that "[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational
goal that a school may pursue" even absent de jure segregation. Id at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.at 797.
Id.at 789.
To the extent that a message is thought to be harmful because of the social meaning it carries, that
meaning can be derived from what the speaker intends to communicate, what the listener ascribes
to the communication, some objective measure of meaning, or some combination of all three. See
Kelly Sarabyn, Racial and Sexual Paternalism, 19 GEO. MVASON U. C.R. L.. 553, 558 (2009). In
any case, no meaning can be ascribed to a message if the message remains unexpressed, which seems
to have been Justice Kennedy/s point in ParentsInvolved.
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harm perceived by both the plurality and Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved
is expressive in nature. 4 8
Shaw v. RenO4 9 similarly found the expressive component of government
race consciousness sufficient to state an equal protection claim. In Shaw, the
North Carolina legislature created a majority black voting district in order to
remedy vote dilutiono and to ameliorate the present effects of past voting
discrimination in North Carolina. 1 The district had an unusual shape because
traditional district lines would not have achieved a majority black district due to
the geographic dispersion of the black population.52 The local Republican Party
and individual white voters sued, alleging that the state's creation of the district
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
As in Parents Involved, there was no allegation in Shaw that the government's actions caused a tangible harm. The Supreme Court accepted the
district court's findings of fact that the race-conscious redistricting had neither
the purpose nor the effect of diluting white voters' voting strength or otherwise
discriminating against them.53 Indeed, as commentators have explained:
Under the statewide redistricting plan [in Shaw], white voters still
constituted a majority in ten, or eighty-three percent, of the twelve congressional districts. With effective control of more than a proportionate
share of seats, white voters in North Carolina could not prove, and did
not try to prove, that the redistricting plan diluted their relative voting
power in intent or effect. 54

48.

49.
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.

At best, the plurality's opinion alluded to two concrete disadvantages imposed by the school
assignment plans: (1) one student's parents thought he would fare better at their first-choice school in
light of his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia; and (2) another student would have
to go to a school farther away from his home. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 713-14, 717. The plurality's reasoning, however, did not turn upon either of these facts; rather, it rested on the alleged
expressive harm.
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Vote dilution occurs when a district form or voting procedure "operate[s] to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial minorities," for example, by submerging a minority group within a larger
white population that consistently votes as a bloc to defeat the minority group's preferred candidates.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1985) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 655-56.
Idat 634.
Id at 638-39, 641.
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 38, at 494; see also Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension ofEqual
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2000) (In Shaw, there were no allegations of vote dilution, thus
no concrete harm to white voters as a result of the oddly shaped majority-minority district."). To be
dear, the redistricting did have a consequence: White voters would no longer be guaranteed to win all
the seats even if they voted as a bloc. But equal protection does not guarantee a right for a single
group to perpetually win a disproportionate share of seats. And in any event, the Court's more conservative Justices have insisted that equal protection only protects individuals, not groups. See, eg,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

Affirmative Action

15

Nonetheless, the Shaw Court found that the redistricting triggered strict
scrutiny. It did so based solely on what the Court perceived to be the
5
impermissible message of the legislature's conduct. Redistricting "that is so
56
bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race," the
Court held, is presumptively unconstitutional. The reason is not because such a
district necessarily causes a concrete injury to any voter, but because of the signal
57
it sends. In other words, "appearances do matter." The appearance of such a
district, according to the Court, "reinforces the perception that members of the
same racial group... think alike [and] share the same political interests . . . .
Moreover, the Court stated, "[t]he message that such districting sends to elected
representatives is equally pernicious"59 because it encourages them to think of
their responsibilities only in terms of a single racial group. The Court further
reasoned that race-conscious redistricting is constitutionally suspect in all circumstances because it is "divisive,"60 creates "antagonisms,"61 and is "at war with
62
the democratic ideal" of "multiracial, multireligious communities." The Court

55.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

concurring in the judgment) ("Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a
debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon the individual...."). The only
injury any individual white voter could have alleged in Shaw was the expressive harm of government
race consciousness.
The Court attempted to analogize the facts of Shaw to Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),
which involved redistricting that changed the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama, "from
a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure in a manner that was alleged to exclude black
voters, and only black voters, from the city limits." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 640 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Gomillion Court held that although the redistricting statute was neutral on its face, the
plaintiffs had stated a prima facie equal protection claim because the redrawn district's shape was
inexplicable on any ground other than racial segregation. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. Gomillion,
however, unlike Shaw, involved not just race consciousness but also a concrete injury from the
race-conscious action. In Gomillion, the result was to exclude virtually all black voters from the city's
boundaries, thereby depriving them of the ability to vote on city matters. See id Nothing remotely
similar was alleged in Shaw All voters could still vote in the relevant elections. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at
681-82 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the difference between Shaw and other "affirmative
action" cases was that in those other cases, race was used "to the advantage of one person. . . at the
obvious expense of a member of a different race.... [and] by contrast, the mere placement of an
individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others").
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 647.
Id (emphasis added).
Id at 648 (emphasis added).
Id (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
Id (quoting Wright, 376 U.S. at 67 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
Id at 648-49 (quoting Wright, 376 U.S. at 67 (Douglas,J., dissenting)); see also Pildes & Niemi, supra
note 38. at 501 ("For the rShawl Court, what distinguishes 'bizarre' race-conscious districts is the
signal they send out that, to government officials, race has become paramount and dwarfed all other,
traditionally relevant criteria.... [This] creates the social impression that one legitimate value has
come to dominate all others.").
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condemned government race consciousness as "reinforc[ing] the belief, held by
too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the
color of their skin."63
Ricci v. DeStefano,64 although nominally decided solely on statutory
grounds, 65 also applied the Court's strict colorblindness doctrine. In Ricci, the
city of New Haven administered a qualifying exam to determine eligibility for
promotions to lieutenant or captain in the fire department. 66 The test,
combined with civil service rules and union agreements governing promotions, resulted in significant racial disparities in who would be eligible for
promotion. Out of seventy-seven firefighters who took the lieutenant's exam,
ten would have been eligible for promotion, all of them white. Out of fortyone firefighters who took the captain's exam, nine would have been eligible for
promotion-seven whites and two Latinos. No blacks were eligible for promotion to either captain or lieutenant.
Mindful of the racial disparity that would result from the promotions
and concerned about liability under the disparate impact provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the city's attorney urged the city not to
certify the test results until it could explore "whether there are other ways to test
for [the promotions] that are equally valid with less adverse [racial] impact."
The city held public hearings regarding the issue and ultimately decided not
to certify the results. Thus, no promotions were made.69
The disappointed firefighters who expected a promotion sued, alleging
that the city's actions violated the disparate treatment provisions of Title VII

63.
64.
65.

Id at 657. Again, as in ParentsInvolved, assigning voters to the district at issue in Shaw involved no
judgment of an individual's worth or merit.
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
Because the Court concluded that the case could be fully resolved on Title VII grounds, it technically
did not reach the constitutional question. Id at 2681. Ricci nonetheless borrowed from constitu-

tional doctrine in at least two ways in reaching its holding. First, as explained below, it derived the
strong basis in evidence standard from its earlier equal protection cases, not its Title VII jurisprudence. Second, the Court's language and reasoning throughout the opinion was reflective of equal
protection doctrine. See Richard Primus, The Future ofDisparateImpact, 108 MCH. L. REv. 1341,

66.
67.
68.
69.

1354 (2010) ("Despite the Court's professed intention to avoid equal protection issues, the Ricci
premise is properly understood as a constitutional proposition as well as a statutory one.").
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
Title VII prohibits both "disparate treatment" (intentional discrimination) and "disparate impact"
(racial disparities caused by facially neutral employment practices). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),
(k)(2006).
Ricci, 129S. Ct. at 2670 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The city's Civil Service Board was responsible for certifying the list of applicants who passed the
test, from which the candidates for promotion would be chosen. Id. at 2665. At the end of a
series of public hearings, the Board split 2-2 with regard to whether to certify the test results, with
the consequence that the list was not certified and no promotions could be made. Id at 2671.
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because they were race conscious. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that
of Title VII's two antidiscrimination provisions-disparate impact and
disparate treatment-the latter generally trumps the former. Borrowing from
70
its affirmative action cases under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
held that Title VII generally prohibits an employer from "tak[ing] adverse
employment actions because of an individual's race" 71 in order to voluntarily
correct for a cognizable disparate impact on persons of a different race. Rather,
the employer must prove not only that the business practice at issue causes a
substantial racial disparity, but also that the employer has a strong basis in evi72
dence to believe it would lose a disparate impact lawsuit if one were brought.
Ricci is relevant for present purposes because of its connection to the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence. Tide VII requires that an employee suffer a
tangible "adverse employment action" in order to state a claim." The Court's
strict colorblindness doctrine, however, does not. Rather, Ricci's constitutionally
influenced reasoning found the injury in the expressive component of government
race consciousness. 74
Given that no promotions were made, there was no formal unequal
treatment in Ricci.75 Contrary to the popular narrative of Ricci, which blamed raw

70.

71.

72.

Id at 2675-76 (setting out the equal protection standard "that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination. . .are constitutional only where there is a strong basis in evidence
that the remedial actions were necessary," and applying that standard to Title VII (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Idat 2673.

As the Court explained, the existence of a statistically significant racial disparity establishes a prima
facie Title VII disparate impact case. However, it does not establish liability

73.
74.

75.

because the City could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if the
examinations were not job related and consistent with business necessity [the defenses
to disparate impact liability], or if there existed an equally valid, less-discriminatory
alternative that served the City's needs but that the City refused to adopt [the
plaintiffs rebuttal if such defenses are proved].
Id at 2678.
Id at 2673; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (finding
that Title VI's antiretaliation provision requires a tangible "injury or harm," either inside or outside
of the workplace).
Understanding these cases as premised on expressive harms also helps explain the apparent
inconsistency between Justice Kennedy's concurrence in ParentsInvolved, approving the use of raceconscious but facially neutral measures, and his opinion for the Court in Ricci. If the message sent by
government race consciousness, rather than the race consciousness itself, is the constitutional injury,
then such an injury occurred in Ricci because the citys actions expressly communicated its racial
concerns. By contrast, race-conscious but facially neutral school integration measures, such as the
location of a new magnet school, do not expressly send a message about race. Cf Primus, supra
note 65, at 1372-74 (positing a "visible victims" reading of Ricci under which the harm would be the
"divisive social meaning" of the city's actions).
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2696 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[The city offiials] were no doubt
conscious of race . .. but this did not mean they had engaged in racially disparate treatment. .. . All
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racial politics for denying the disappointed firefighters the promotions they had
earned, the plaintiffs did not actually have a vested right to promotion. At
most, they, like all the other firefighters, were deprived of the opportunity to be
considered for promotions at that time based on the results of that test.76 Thus,
unlike remedial or diversifying affirmative action programs that involve the distribution of a limited resource, the city's action in Ricci did not allocate a resource
on the basis of race.77
There was also no claim in Ricci that the city's actions subordinated or
stigmatized the disappointed firefighters because of their race, even if they were
formally treated equally. What was left, then, as in Shaw and ParentsInvolved,

76.

77.

78.

the test results were discarded, no one was promoted, and firefighters of every race will have to
participate in another selection process to be considered for promotion." (alterations in original
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); seealso Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's PostRacial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum UnderstandingofEquality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 245
(2010) ("Mr. Ricci was not treated differently than any other firefighter based on race, and in fact
was not treated differently than any other firefighter at all: the test results were discarded for all,
regardless of race, and no one was promoted, regardless of race."). Indeed, it was primarily for this
reason that the district court rejected the plaintiffi' equal protection clain in Ricci. See Ricci v.
DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160462 (D. Conn. 2006) (rejecting the plaintiffs' equal protection
claim because, inter alia, no unequal treatment occurred). Ricci is therefore in substantial tension with
the Court's earlier decision in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), which held that some
actual differential treatment must occur in order for an equal protection injury to exist. Palmer is
discussed in detail in Part II, infra.
Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160 ("[A]pplication of the [civil service rules] would [only] give top
scorers an opportunity for promotion, depending on the number of vacancies, but no guarantee of
promotion; it is even conceivable that the applicant with the highest score never would be promoted." (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The higher-scoring test takers
were differently situated from those who scored lower in the following sense: Under the civil service
rules, they may have had a greater hope of being promoted if vacancies were available. In other
words, a sufficiently high score was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for promotion.
Accordingly, those firefighters with higher scores perhaps had a greater hope of promotion than
those with lower scores. This attenuated hope, however, is not the equivalent of a vested right to
promotion. To the extent those firefighters were deprived of something, it was the expectation that promotions would continue to be made without regard to the existing pattern of
minority exclusion.
As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, it is for this reason that "[t]his litigation does not involve
affirmative action" as traditionally defined. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The equal protection cases from which the Ricci Court drew the strong basis in evidence standard all
involved traditional affirmative action measures by which the government, for putatively worthy
goals, distributed a benefit on the basis of race. Ricci is therefore not only in tension with cases
like Palmer v. Thompson, but also with the very precedents upon which it purported to rely.
As discussed in Part II, infra, this Article contends that government action imposing racial stigma
is a proper area for robust judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause. Stigmatic harms are
those messages and practices that have over time and in historical context acquired a defined social
meaning of inferiority or other negative traits associated with a particular characteristic, such as race.
See generally Lenhardt, supra note 5, at 813-48 (describing the aspects of racial stigma). By way of
illustrating the distinction between stigmatic harm and other expressive harms, this Article in Part
II, infra, discusses in detail the differences between the alleged harm at issue in Ricci and that at
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was an expressive harm." The disparate impact provisions of Title VII require
that employers be cognizant of even unintentional racial disparities, with an eye
toward whether they have been caused by "needlessly exclusionary" 0 business
practices. It is that race consciousness-and more specifically, the message sent
by government action to correct such disparities-that violated the Court's
colorblindness doctrine.81
Parents Involved, Shaw, and Ricci hold that the Equal Protection Clause is
presumptively violated whenever the government acts ina race-conscious manner,
even if there is no unequal treatment or tangible injury, because such action
allegedly expresses a divisive social message or provokes resentment. As is more
filly developed in Part III, this Article contends that in the absence of concrete
injury, differential treatment, or racial stigmatization, the Supreme Court should
leave debates about social meaning to the democratic process. At a bare minimum, however, the Court should be consistent regarding when expressive harms,
standing alone, violate the Equal Protection. Clause. As demonstrated in the
following Part, notwithstanding the Court's solicitude for claims of expressive
harm in the affirmative action context, it has rejected such claims when they
involve the stigmatization of racial minorities unless they are accompanied by
some tangible harm or unequal treatment.
II.

EXPRESSIVE H1ARMS TO RACIAL MINORITIES
(OR UNEQUAL PROTECTION)

The contrast between the Court's willingness to accept claims involving
primarily expressive harms in the context of affirmative action and its disregard

79.

80.
81.

issue in Brown v. BoardofEducation. Although both appear to present circumstances in which the
expressive component of race-conscious action alone was sufficient to create an equal protection
harm regardless of formal equality of treatment, I argue that the cases in context are profoundly
different. Most notably, the government's race-conscious segregation in Brown caused stigmatization of black schoolchildren, which affected their educational opportunities. By contrast, the
plaintiffs in Ricci did not suffer racial stigmatization and/or tangible harm caused thereby.
Seegeneraly Norton, supra note 75, at 249-50 (discussing Ricci and suggesting, inter alia, that the case
can be understood as one about social meaning). See also Primus,supra note 65, at 1371 (stating that
the Court's concern in such cases "is a concern about social meaning ... [that] the government sees
people as members of racial groups rather than as individuals").
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Indeed, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Ricci explicitly raised the connection between the Court's equal
protection colorblindness jurisprudence and its decision in Ricci. He argued that the theory of
disparate impact liability requires employers to act in a race-conscious manner in this sense: In order
to avoid or remedy a racially disparate impact, one must first notice the racial disparity. Justice Scalia
suggested that since the Court's precedents generally prohibit the government itself from noticing
race, it may also be unconstitutional for the government to require others to do so. See idt at 2682
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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of such claims when premised upon subordination of minorities is striking.
Both situations involve claims that the social meaning of government action
inflicts an expressive harm. In the cases discussed in the previous Part, the
alleged harm is white resentment, divisiveness, and the contradiction of
postracialism that results from the government's race-conscious action intended
to aid racial minorities. In the cases discussed in this Part, the alleged harm is
stigmatization of racial minorities by virtue of government action that treats
them as inferior, undesirable, dangerous, or threatening to white purity. One
need not believe that the expressive harms in the latter category are necessarily
more significant than those in the former to think that a doctrine premised on
expressive harm would presumably treat both similarly. Yet the Court has
consistently rejected constitutional claims based primarily on expressive harms
suffered by racial minorities. 2
In Memphis v. Greene," for example, the City of Memphis, at the request
of residents of a predominantly white area, closed a street running through
their neighborhood. The result of the street dosing was to separate the white
area from the African American area bordering it. Residents of the African
American neighborhood sued, alleging two distinct theories. The first was that
the street closing violated 42 U.S.C. § 198284 by impairing their property
interests. The Court rejected this claim, finding no concrete impairment of their
property interests, such as depreciation of the economic value of their property,
caused by the street closing. Plaintiffs separately argued that the street closing
violated the Thirteenth Amendment" as an expressive harm imposing a
"badge or incident of slavery,"" whether or not it inflicted a tangible economic
harm upon individual residents of the black neighborhood. Plaintiffs' Thirteenth
Amendment theory was that the separation of the neighborhoods conveyed a
stigmatizing message of blacks as "undesirable"" persons whose presence would

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.

As discussed toward the end of this Part, not even in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), did the Supreme Court find that the expressive harm of de jure segregation standing alone
violated equal protection.
451 U.S. 100 (1981).
Section 1982 provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right.., to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
In addition to prohibiting literal slavery and involuntary servitude, the Thirteenth Amendment
has been interpreted to prohibit "badges and incidents of slavery," that is, the lingering vestiges of the slave system. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968)
(holding that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to enact legislation
prohibiting
private
housing discrimination).
Greene, 451 U.S. at109.
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disrupt and devalue the "tranquil[ ]"" white neighborhood. Plaintiffs also
submitted expert testimony regarding the negative psychological effects of the
resultant segregation on black residents, who would likely see the street dosing
as a "monument to racial hostility." 89
The Court, while accepting that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches the
badges and incidents of slavery, 90 rejected the argument that the harm in
Greene amounted to a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court
characterized the real-world impact of the street dosing as de minimis because,
in the Court's view, it amounted to a mere inconvenience to black residents. 9'
The lack of a substantial impairment of a tangible interest, according to the
Court, left only the expressive harm of de facto segregation. The Court
dismissed the significance of that injury in a single sentence: "To regard [the
street closing] as a form of stigma so severe as to violate the Thirteenth
Amendment would trivialize the great purpose of that charter of freedom."92
The Court found this to be the case despite significant evidence in the record
regarding the racialized context of the decision to close the street, 93 including
the district court's factual finding that the white neighborhood had been
developed "as an exclusive residential neighborhood for white citizens and
[that] these characteristics have been maintained."94 Under Greene, then,
expressive harms to racial minorities are constitutionally trivial when unaccompanied by any substantial effect on their material interests.95

88.
89.
90.

91.

92.
93.
94.

95.

Id at119.
Id at 140 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id at 124-25 (majority opinion). More precisely, the Court stated that the Thirteenth Amendment
empowers Congress to enact legislation prohibiting the badges and incidents of slavery, it left open
the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment itself, absent such legislation, also reaches the
badges and incidents of slavery. Id at 125-26. For a full discussion of this issue, see, for example,
William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and
Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311 (2007); Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of
Congress's Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boeme v. Flores, 88 WASH. U.
L. REV. 77 (2010).
Greene, 451 U.S at 111-12, 119 (stating that although "the motorists who will be inconvenienced by
the dosing are primarily black, the extent of the inconvenience is not great" and that "[t]he dosing
has not affected the value of property owned by black citizens, but it has caused some slight
inconvenience to black motorists").
Id at 128.
See id at 137-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (summarizing the trial testimony and findings of fact, and
noting that "[t]he city ofMemphis has an unfortunate but very real history of racial segregation").
Id at 137; see also David Tyler, Traffic Regulation or Racial Segregation? The Closing of West Drive
andMemphis v. Greene (1981), 66 TENN. HIST. Q56 (2007), availableathttp://dlynx.rhodes.edu/
jspui/bitstream/10267/2400/1/HollywooLspringdaleDaviLTyler.pdf (describing in detail the
history of racial segregation and hostility in the era leading up to Greene).
Plaintiffs also alleged that the city's actions violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court rejected
this claim, holding that "the absence of proof of discriminatory intent forecloses any claim that the
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Palmer v. Thompson96 provides another example of the Court's disdain for
expressive harms when suffered by racial minorities. In Palmer, residents of
Jackson, Mississippi, sued the city for maintaining segregated public facilities. 97
In response to a ruling that such facilities violated the Equal Protection Clause,
the city desegregated its public parks, auditoriums, zoo, and golf courses."
However, the city refused to desegregate its public swimming pools, choosing
instead to dose them all.99
The plaintiffs in Palmer filed a subsequent lawsuit seeking to enforce the
desegregation decree by requiring the city to reopen the pools. Plaintiffs
alleged that the city's action violated both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Thirteenth Amendment because it amounted to an official expression of the
message that blacks were "so inferior that they [were] unfit to share with
whites this particular type of public facility."oo The historical and factual
contexto' of this message could not have been lost on the Court; indeed,
much of it was directly presented in the petitioners' briefs and affidavits. 102
Mississippi was one of the strongholds ofJim Crow.0 3 Due to Jackson's staunch

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

101.

102.

103.

official action challenged in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause.. .. " Greene, 451 U.S.
at 119.
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
Id at 218-19 (describing the procedural history of the case).
Id at 219.
Id
Id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting). Given that the city agreed to desegregate all its public
facilities other than swimming pools, it seems likely that city officials and white residents found
something about associating with blacks in this context to be particularly objectionable. It is
reasonable to suppose that stereotypes regarding black cleanliness and of African American
men as hypersexualized predators created especially heightened resistance to integrating the
pools. SeegenerallyJEFFWILTSE, CONTESTED WATERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SWIMMING
POOLS IN AMERICA 154-80 (2007) (discussing the history of and resistance to efforts to
desegregate municipal swimming pools). See also GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK
IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND
DESTINY 1817-1914, at 252 (1987); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 41-47
(1978); Martha A. Myers, The New South's "New" Black Criminal: Rape and Punishment
in Georgia, 1870-1940, in ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME 145, 146 (Darnell F. Hawkins
ed., 1995).
1 provide such context here not as an historical exercise but because, as the Court has recently
reiterated, "Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
See Brief for Petitioners at 4, Palmer, 403 U.S. 217 (No. 107), 1970 WL 136648, at *4 ("The City
of Jackson and the State of Mississippi have for many years maintained a steel-hard, inflexible,
undeviating official policy of segregation." (quoting United States v. City ofJackson, 318 F.2d 1,5
(5th Cir. 1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS 482-91 (1988) (describing Mississippi's
segregationist policies).
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maintenance of an official policy of segregation, civil rights activists targeted
the city for Freedom Rides in 1961.'0 The Freedom Rides were aimed at
testing the legal force of the Supreme Court's decision in Boynton v. Virginia,os
which held segregation in interstate passenger transportation facilities to be
illegal. The city responded by beating, arresting, and jailing Freedom Riders. 06
These events occurred one year prior to the filing of the lawsuit in Palmer.
One year after the desegregation lawsuit in Palmer was filed, Medgar
Evers, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) Field Secretary for Mississippi, was assassinated at his home in.Jackson
by a white supremacist named Byron De La Beckwith.o' Despite overwhelming
evidence of Beckwith's guilt, all-white juries twice deadlocked, leading to
mistrials.'a During the second trial, Ross Barnett, a former governor of Mississippi
and an ardent segregationist,109 strode into the courtroom and shook Beckwith's
hand in a show of support.110
Palmer, like Greene, involved a message with a clear text, context, and
subtext. The message's text was unmistakable. Integrating the swimming pools
was a line the city would not cross because of white residents' revulsion at
associating with blacks in intimate settings. The message's context, as described
above, involved a city and a state wielding official power to maintain apartheid.
The message's subtext was equally dear: Blacks were unfit for such association
because they were inferior, unclean, and dangerous. Indeed, the semiotic function of de jure segregation was as important as its instrumental purpose of
keeping the races physically separate."' The Palmer Court nonetheless rejected

104. See RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 251-94 (2006).
105. 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
106. See BRANCH, supra note 103, at 482 (describing the treatment of Freedom Riders in Mississippi,
including Jackson); see also Interview by Charlene Thompson With Hillman Frazier in
Jackson, Miss. (Aug. 5, 1998), available at http://mshistory.kl2.ms.us/artides/60/index.php?s=
extra&id=258 ("Allen C. Thompson [the mayor of Jackson during the Freedom Rides and the
Palmerv. Thompson litigation] was... known for the famous Thompson Tank. He used that to
arrest the marchers at the time. And also he used the police force and the fire department to spray
the marchers at the time.").
107. See generally ADAM NOSSITER, OF LONG MEMORY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE MURDER OF
MEDGAR EVERS (1994). See also TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING
YEARS 108 (1998) (discussing Evers's assassination).
108. NOSSITER, supra note 107, at xiv.
109. Among other matters, Barnett had been held in contempt of court for obstructing the courtordered desegregation of the University of Mississippi. See Meredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 586 (5th
Cir. 1962) (en banc).
110. NOSSITER, supra note 107, at 108-09.
111. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 1528 ("Racial segregation sends the message that blacks
are untouchable, a kind of social pollutant from which 'pure' whites must be protected. . .. Once
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the plaintiffs' Thirteenth Amendment argument, stating that accepting their
claim would require the Court to "severely stretch [the Thirteenth Amendment's]
short simple words and do violence to its history."112
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, reasoning
that no denial of equal protection occurred because all persons were treated
equally. The effect of the city's action was that the public pools were closed to all
citizens, regardless of race. The key to the equal protection inquiry, according
to Palmer, is the "actual effect"" 3 of the government action. The Court held that
absent some action "affecting blacks differently from whites,"' 14 the Equal
Protection Clause provides no relief, notwithstanding the government's motivation or dignitary harms caused by the government's action." 5
While Palmer and Greene are older cases, and Palmer's highly formalistic
view of equal protection has been criticized," 6 the Court has neither overruled
nor disclaimed these cases. Indeed, the Court's more conservative Justices have,
until Ricci, adhered to the view that some actual differential treatment is required
to state an equal protection claim. Justice Scalia wrote:
[I]t could be argued that discrimination is not legitimated by being
applied, so to speak, indiscriminately; that the unlawfulness of
treating one person differently on irrelevant grounds is not erased by
subjecting everyone else to the same unlawfulness. The response to this
is . . . "treated differently" [is] only pertinent ... in the sense of being

deprived of any benefit[,] subjected to any slight or obloquy [or]
[d]eprecat[ing] [the person's] group, and thereby stigmatiz[ing] his
own personality."'

people share an understanding that segregation laws express contempt for blacks, these laws
constitute blacks as an 'untouchable,' stigmatized caste."); Reginald Oh, InterracialMarriagein the
Shadows ofJim Crow: Racial Segregation as a System of Racial and Gender Subordination, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2006) ("The systematic physical and social separation of the
white and black races was fundamental to maintaining a social system of white supremacy and
black inferiority.").
112. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971).
113. Id at 225.

114. Id
115. As an example of such a cognizable effect, the Court cited Gomillion v. Lighoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), wherein "the Alabama Legislature's gerrymander of the boundaries of Tuskegee excluded
virtually all Negroes from voting in town elections." Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225.
116. See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial
Profiling,39 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 17,33-36 &nn.85-96 (2004) and authorities cited therein.
117. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Powers, the Court extended its holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to
encompass race-based peremptory jury challenges where the defendant and the excluded juror are
of different races. The Court reasoned that the defendant in such cases had a kind of third-party
standing to object to the racialized treatment of the stricken juror, despite the fact that the
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Brown v. Board ofEducation" is often misunderstood as resting solely on

the expressive harm of racial segregation. To be sure, in holding de jure segregated public schools to be unconstitutional, the Brown Court reasoned that such
schools "denot[ed] the inferiority of the negro group."119 Segregated schools
denoted black inferiority because state-sponsored physical separation of the
races had a stigmatizing social meaning as to blacks.' 20 However, stigmatization
flows not merely from the expression of a message of race consciousness, but
from the content and context of such a message.' 2' State-sponsored segregation
imposed a stigma, harkening back to the Slave Codes and Black Codes,122 of
blacks as "inferior and degraded"123 in order to maintain white supremacy.124
Brown's concern with social meaning, then, was not with race as an abstraction,
but with the imposition of racial stigma throughout American history as a means
of subordinating blacks and reinforcing white supremacy.
Brown did hold state-sponsored segregation in public schools to be
25
unconstitutional because of the psychological damage to black schoolchildren.1
The Court found the stigmatizing harm of segregation to violate the Equal
Protection Clause despite evidence "that the Negro and white schools involved
have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors."126 But even

defendant himself would presumably suffer no prejudice by having a juror of his own race seated
on the jury. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11. Justice Scalia dissented because, in his view, race-based
peremptory challenges are based on the "undeniable reality.. . that all groups tend to have
particular sympathies and hostilities-most notably, sympathies ... towards their own group
members." Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because, Justice Scalia reasoned, "that reality is
acknowledged as to all groups, and forms the basis for peremptory strikes as to all of them," there
is neither unequal treatment nor opprobrium or stigma. Id; see also United States v. Armstrong,
517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (holding that under "ordinary equal protection standards... , [in order
to] establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated
individuals of a different race were not prosecuted").
118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

119. Id.at 494.
120. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427
(1960) ("[T]he social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a position of walled-

off inferiority.. . .").
121. See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 5, at 848-64 (discussing the historical and social science evidence
regarding the role of context in the imposition of racial stigma).
122. For a discussion of the Slave Codes and Black Codes, see Carter, supra note 116, at 56-68.
123. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
124. Black, supra note 120, at 424-25 ("The South fought to keep slavery, and lost. Then it tried
the Black Codes, and lost. Then it looked around for something else and found segregation. The
movement for segregation was an integral part of the movement to maintain and firther 'white
supremacy'. .. )
125. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
126. Id at 492.
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Brown's holding on this point did not go as far as the contemporary Court's
strict colorblindness doctrine. Brown's holding regarding the psychic injury to
black schoolchildren was premised on the fact that the stigmatization interfered
with their educational opportunities. The Brown Court stated:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in [an]

integrated school system. 2
In Brown, then, the Court found that public school segregation violated
the Equal Protection Clause because segregation's message (black inferiority)
occurred in a context (the history of racial subjugation) where it imposed a dignitary harm (stigma) having concomitant effects (psychic injury and diminution of
educational opportunity).' 28 By contrast, in Palmer and Greene, although many
of these same elements were present, the Court found that the absence of tangible harm or unequal treatment rendered equal protection unavailing.
Loving v. Virginia'29 is the closest the Court has come to accepting a claim
of expressive harm in a case involving subordination of racial minorities. In
Loving, the Court held that Virginia's prohibition of marriages between whites
and nonwhites was unconstitutional. The state argued that its laws did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because the statutes "punish[ed] equally
both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage."" 0 Thus,
the state argued, no unequal treatment occurred. The Court rejected the argument that this formal equal treatment immunized the statute from strict

127. Id. at 494 (alterations in original omitted) (emphasis added); cf Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 682
n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Shaw from Brown by noting that "a principal
consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas
use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality
of political participation").
128. But see Anderson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 1543-45 (arguing that desegregation cases
subsequent to Brown did not expressly rely on the consequences of racial stigmatization in holding
segregation in other public facilities unconstitutional); Hellman, supra note 54, at 10 (arguing
that, although Brown's holding is grounded on segregation's psychic damage and educational
harm, "[the state may not adopt policies that express a message of unequal worth . . . [regardless
of] whether the state action causes [such] concrete harm to identifiable people").
129. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
130. Id at 8.
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scrutiny. The Court stated, "[W]e reject the notion that the mere equal
application of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the
classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious
racial discriminations."131
The Loving Court did condemn antimiscegenation laws as unconsti1 32
tutional "endorsement[s] of the doctrine of White Supremacy," regardless of
the fact that both whites and nonwhites were subject to punishment for
violating these laws. Such laws, however, did much more than express an
abstract ideology of "color-consciousness."133 As the Court has noted in its
Establishment Clause cases, whether a particular government action can be seen
134
as an endorsement of an unconstitutional message depends on the context.
The context of Loving included the fact that Virginia's antimiscegenation laws
were originally enacted as part of its Racial Integrity Act of 1924, which was
"passed during the period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the
First World War.""35 Antimiscegenation laws, moreover, cannot be separated
from the historical fact that they served both as reflections of and inspirations
for one of the most common pretexts for lynchings: The charge that a black
36
man had directed romantic attention at a white woman.1 In contrast to voluntary efforts to maintain public school integration (Parents Involved), or to
provide an opportunity for racial diversity in democratic representation (Shaw)
or in supervisory positions in public safety forces (Ricci), the context of Loving
rendered the message of antimiscegenation laws unmistakably one of white
supremacy, not merely race consciousness.

131. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at7.
133. The message of the antimiscegenation laws was not race consciousness, but rather protecting
white purity, as evidenced by the fact that those laws prohibited only interracial marriages in
which one of the partners was white. They did not, for example, prohibit marriages between
blacks and Latinos. Id. at 11 n.11.
134. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) (stating, in upholding an Ohio
program providing publicly funded school vouchers that could be used at religious schools, that
the "endorsement inquiry" depends upon "'the history and context' underlying a challenged
program" (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 538 U.S. 98, 119 (2001))).
135. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6.
136. See, e.g., DORA APEL, IMAGERY OF LYNCHING: BLACK MEN, WHITE WOMEN, AND THE
MOB 44 (2004) (stating that "[a]nti-miscegenation laws supported lynch law in seeking to
maintain white social domination through the prevention of intermixing and the resultant 'racial
blurring"'); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial
Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1327 (2004) ("[L]ynchings were generally justified as
appropriately responsive to attacks on white womanhood and were motivated by a fear of the
black man's mythic sexual savagery.").
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Moreover, the harm inflicted by antimiscegenation laws was far from merely
expressive. Such laws criminalized marriages between whites and nonwhites
and violations carried substantial criminal penalties. Virginia, for example, made
such marriages felonies carrying a sentence of imprisonment between one and
five years."' The Court clearly considered the criminal consequences of antimiscegenation laws to be particularly inimical to the Equal Protection Clause,
stating that it "[could not] conceive of a valid legislative purpose which makes
the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal
offense."" 8 Moreover, in addition to imposing criminal penalties, antimiscegenation laws also infringed upon the freedom to marry, which the Court has
"recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."' This fundamental due process right, the Court held,
"[may] not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination[ ]."140 Loving then,
like Brown, presented a case of stigma, which arose from the historical and
contemporaneous context and was connected to tangible injuries.
In summary, the Court's strict colorblindness doctrine in cases such as
Shaw, Parents Involved, and Ricci departs dramatically from its doctrine in prior
cases. In cases such as Palmer and Greene, the Court has rejected claims of primarily expressive harms when the harm involved the alleged stigmatization or
subordination of racial minorities.14 Rather, it has held, substantial harm in the

137. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4. The Lovings, for example, pleaded guilty and were each sentenced to
one year in prison. The trial court, however, suspended their sentences on the condition that they
leave Virginia and not return together for twenty-five years. Id at 3.
138. Id at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) (writing
separately to reiterate his belief that "it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our
Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
139. Id at 12 (majority opinion).
140. Id
141. 1 recognize that certain Justices, most notably Justice Thomas, believe that government race
consciousness inevitably stigmatizes racial minorities. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that affirmative action
programs stigmatize racial minorities because "[t]hese programs stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are
entitled to preferences" (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))). If that were invariably (or even
frequently) the case, one would expect to more often see racial minorities, rather than whites, as
plaintiffs in cases challenging affirmative action programs. Moreover, the assumption that affirmative action programs stigmatize racial minorities is most often framed as involving self doubt as
to whether one deserved something based on one's own merit or instead received it because of
race. Whatever force that argument may have in other contexts, it is inapposite here. It is difficult
to see how government race consciousness that does not involve the allocation of a tangible
resource or benefit, one that would otherwise ordinarily be distributed based on nonracial fasctors,
could lead to this sort of stigma being imposed on racial minorities. It is doubtful, for example,
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form of material disadvantage or differential treatment must also exist. The
Court has, however, accepted claims of primarily expressive and nonstigmatizing harms when those claims have been directed against government programs
designed to achieve or maintain racial diversity or to improve the lives of people
of color. The Court has accepted such claims regardless of whether the plaintiffs
suffered unequal treatment or a tangible injury. This Part does not take a
position as to whether expressive harms should or should not ever be sufficient
to establish an equal protection claim in all circumstances. Rather, the point is
that the Supreme Court-even in Brown-has consistently required some
concrete injury or differential treatment when claims by racial minorities are at
issue, whereas the Court appears to accept claims of expressive harm when made
14 2
by opponents of affirmative action. "Appearances," it seems, matter most to
the Court when they draw attention to continued racial inequities and thereby
convey a message in contradiction to postracialism as a fait accompli.
III.

RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH

The discussion in the preceding Parts makes visible the implicit metaphor
on which the Court has relied in its strict colorblindness cases. Although the
Court speaks in terms of unequal treatment in these cases, the Court is truly analyzing such cases as involving a form of forbidden speech. As discussed in Part I,
cases such as Parents Involved, Shaw, and Ricci invalidate government action
when it conveys a message that racial inequality persists. Yet the Court has
been highly selective with regard to when the expressive content of government
action conveying racial messages is by itself sufficient to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. As Part II demonstrates, the Court has only found this to be
the case when the claims attack government action that seeks to address racial
inequality. When government action stigmatizing racial minorities has been

that children of color in the Seattle and Louisville school districts at issue in ParentsInvolved were
plagued by self-doubt as to whether they had earned the right to be assigned to a given public
school. Finally, recent empirical research casts serious doubt on the claim that racial minorities
view affirmative action programs as stigmatizing. See Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise:An
EmpiricalAnalysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1199

(2010) (describing a national study seeking to gauge whether racial minorities experienced
affirmative action as stigmatizing, and concluding that, while "one would anticipate that
underrepresented minority students attending school in the states that [ban] race-based
admissions would suffer lower rates of internal and external stigma as well as less hostility in the
form of racism from nonminority students... . [i]n fact, the opposite is true, [and
u]nderrepresented minority students in states that permit affirmative action encounter far less
hostility and internal and external stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states").
142. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
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involved, the Court has never accepted the notion that government messages by
themselves violate equal protection. Rather, the Court has expressly held in cases
such as Palmer and Greene that some unequal treatment or substantial tangible
harm must accompany the objectionable message.
Unpacking the colorblindness doctrine therefore reveals that it is not about
discrimination in the usual equal protection sense of unequal treatment, subordination, stigmatization, or disadvantage. Rather, it is about the Court mandating
a particular vision of the role that race plays in contemporary American society, a
vision that condemns certain messages regarding race while permitting others.
The strict colorblindness doctrine has codified in constitutional law the narrative
that "we have overcome" and eliminated discursive and democratic space for the
competing narrative that "we shall overcome."
The strict colorblindness doctrine treats any remedial or diversifying
government race consciousness as constitutionally suspect because of its message
alone. The message of such government action is condemned because it is
counter to what the Court has found to be a more important message. That
message can be characterized in a variety of ways: liberal individualism,14 3
postracialism,'" antipaternalism, 14 5 or antibalkanization.146 The fact remains
that by elevating the message to a constitutional principle in the guise of equal
protection, "the Court has taken sides in the culture war [about race], departing

143.

See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (stating that equal protection embodies "the simple command that the Government
must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class" (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
L6pez, supra note 31, at 989 (noting that opponents of affirmative action programs argue that
such programs "undermin[e] liberal notions of individual merit"). However, as this Article points
out, not all instances of government race consciousness involve the allocation of material resources
or impose a disadvantage based on race. The strict colorblindness doctrine therefore cannot be
grounded solely upon the alleged subversion of individual merit. Cf ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at
834 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the case from earlier "affirmative action" cases because
the student assignment plans did not involve "the use of race to decide who will receive goods or
services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and which are in short supply"); Cristina
M. Rodriguez, Against Individualized Consideration, 83 IND. LJ. 1405, 1417 (2008) (arguing that
"merit" is not a meaningful concept when considering assignment to general elementary and secondary public schools).
144. See generally Cho, supra note 3 (analyzing postracial ideology that marginalizes race as a basis
for policymaking).
145. See generally Sarabyn, supra note 47 (tracing the history and evolution of paternalism in equal
protection jurisprudence).
146. See generally Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE LJ. 1278 (2011) (identifing the antibalkanization
principle as an independent doctrinal middle ground between colorblindness theory and
antisubordination theory, under which government action violates the Equal Protection Clause
when it is seen as causing divisiveness and threatening social cohesion).
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from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of
engagement are observed."4 7 Accordingly, this Article now turns to the doctrinal ground where battles about the values expressed by competing messages
are usually fought: the First Amendment.
A.

The Government Speech Doctrine

The government speech doctrine is a fairly recent development in First
Amendment law.148 The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] government entity
has the right to speak for itself. It is entitled to say what it wishes, and to select
the views that it wants to express." 1 49 Thus, the government speech doctrine operates as an exception to the usual First Amendment requirements of government
content and viewpoint neutrality. 50 Government entities may express or promote their own messages. The key to the doctrine is that the speech must be the
government's own.15' If the government disfavors or endorses private speech,
the usual First Amendment rules of content and viewpoint neutrality apply.
The Court has offered two main rationales for the government speech
doctrine. First, the doctrine recognizes that the effective functioning of government sometimes requires it to express or promote its own viewpoints
through its policies.' 52 Indeed, the Court has stated, "It is not easy to imagine
Government
how government could function if it lacked this freedom.""

147. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
finding unconstitutional a Texas law criminalizing certain homosexual conduct and overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). I do not share Justice Scalia's belief that the Court
should avoid ruling on contentious social issues even when they involve discrimination against
minorities, nor do I believe that the Court's decision in Lawrence was wrong. Indeed, in
Lawrence, the Court was presented not just with an expressive harm to gays, but also a concrete
disadvantage imposed upon them, criminal prosecution. Rather, I quote his dissent in Lawrence
to point out that, in the debate over colorblindness versus positive color consciousness, the Court
has taken a side rather than acting as a neutral observer of the democratic debate about race.
148. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (describing the government speech doctrine as "recently minted").
149. Id. at 1131 (majority opinion) (internal citations, alteration, and quotation marks omitted).
150. See Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 899,
901 (2010) (stating that the doctrine is "a defense to First Amendment challenges by plaintiffs
who claim that the government has impermissibly excluded their expression based on viewpoint").
151. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) ("In all of the cases
invalidating exactions to subsidize speech, the speech was, or was presumed to be, that of an entity
other than the government itself."); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001)
("We have said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker .. . .").
152. See fohanns, 544 U.S. at 559 ("[S]ome government programs involve, or entirely consist of,
advocating a position.").
153. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131.
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entities routinely express certain messages rather than others. A requirement
of absolute neutrality regarding the government's own speech would be
untenable. The government, for example, can spend funds to promote its own
message of honoring military veterans without being required to spend similar
funds honoring the country's wartime enemies.' 54 The Court has held that the
First Amendment allows such selectivity, provided that the government does not
suppress competing private speech or violate another constitutional provision in
effectuating its own speech.'
The second rationale for the government speech doctrine relates to democratic accountability. Strict judicial review is applied when the government
engages in content or viewpoint discrimination regarding private speech because
such suppression or favoritism is usually a sign of a defect in the democratic
process. 6 When the government privileges or punishes private speech, it is generally because the disfavored speaker or the message is one that the government
dislikes, disagrees with, or finds dangerous."' Thus, either the speaker or the
speech is presumed to be the kind of "discrete and insular minority" for which
heightened scrutiny is appropriate since the speaker cannot effectively protect
him or herself through the political process. 58 By contrast, the Court has stated,
"When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to
advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the
political process for its advocacy."1 59 Thus, the government speech doctrine
holds that there is no need for a judicial check on the government's own speech

154.

Cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (stating by way of analogy, in rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to federal regulations prohibiting finding recipients from promoting or
discussing abortion, that "[w]hen Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund
a program to encourage ... communism and fascism" (citation omitted)).
155. See, e.g., Summum, 129S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Ejven if the Free Speech Clause
neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by the
Constitution's other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and Equal
Protection Clauses.").

156. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 135-79 (1980) (discussing "process defect theory" as a reason for judicial intervention on
behalf of minorities).
157. For the argument that laws suppressing speech "pose the inherent risk that the Govemment
seeks ... to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion," see Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994).
158. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (recognizing without
deciding that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
159. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
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because such speech is presumably both generated by and subject to correction
through normal political processes. 6 o
Rust v. Sullivan161 is considered to be the first major Supreme Court case
6
applying the government speech doctrine.1 ' Rust involved a First Amendment

challenge to regulations that prohibited programs that received federal family
63
The regulations
planning funds from providing abortion-related services.'
conditioned funding on recipients refraining from engaging in a variety of
4
pro-choice expressive activity.' 6 The Court ruled that the First Amendment
did not forbid the government from choosing to fund certain programs to the

exclusion of others in order to advance its own message. The Court reasoned
that the regulations did not punish, proscribe, or privilege private speech based
on its viewpoint, but were instead a constitutionally permissible instance of the
government using public funds to promote the government's own antiabortion speech.

In Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez,165 by contrast, the Court found the
government speech doctrine inapplicable.

Velasquez concerned restrictions

imposed on recipients of federal funding from the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC) to provide legal services to the indigent. The restrictions prohibited
grantees from engaging in legal representation aimed at challenging existing
welfare law.' 66 Thus, the speech at issue was that of attorneys representing their

160. See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (justifying the government speech doctrine in terms of
democratic accountability and stating that "[i]f the citizenry objects [to a governmental message],
newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position" (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Transparency is an underlying assumption of the political accountability rationale
for the government speech doctrine because the political process can only function as a check on
government speech if a reasonable recipient of the speech would know that the speech is the govemrnmens. See, e.g., Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS
LJ. 983, 988 (2005) (stating that "[wihen the government participates in public debate, it should
make the fact of its participation transparent"); Norton & Citron, supra note 150, at 902 ('The
public can assess government's positions only when the public can tell that the government is
speaking."). In the kinds of cases with which this Article is concerned, it is likely to be dear that
the government is the speaker. Private parties do not, for example, enact legislation, hire or promote public employees (Ricci), determine public school assignments (ParentsInvolved), or engage
in redistricting (Shaw). The transparency and accountability rationales for the government speech
doctrine will therefore usually be satisfied in such cases.
161. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
162. While the Rust Court did not use the term government speech in its analysis, the Court has
subsequently pointed to Rust as the genesis of the government speech doctrine. See Norton &
Citron, supra note 150, at 904 ('The Supreme Court identifies Rust v. Sullivan as the beginning
of its government speech jurisprudence.").
163. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-81 (describing the regulations in detail).
164. See id at 179-81.
165. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
166. Id at 538 (describing the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions).
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clients. Various LSC grantees and clients sued, alleging that the restrictions
violated the First Amendment. The government argued that the restrictions were
permissible under Rust. The Court disagreed, distinguishing Rust as involving
the government promoting its own message by transmitting it through private
speakers. 67 Velasquez, in the Court's view, instead involved government
facilitation of private speech, not the harnessing of private speech to promote a
government message. The Court reasoned that selectively funding private speech
for its own sake runs the risk that the government has done so to suppress dangerous or disfavored ideas. When the government itself speaks or promotes its
own message by subsidizing private speech, however, it is functioning as another
speaker in the marketplace of ideas and ultimately remains accountable to the
voters if they disagree with the message. 68 In short, when promoting the government's own message is the goal and subsidizing private speech is the means,
the government speech exception applies. When promoting or suppressing
private speech is the goal, the government speech exception does not apply.
The Velasquez Court rejected the government speech argument, stating that
"[t]he lawyer is not the government's speaker." 169 Indeed, in a suit challenging
existing welfare law on behalf of a client, the attorney's speech would be in opposition to the government's position. Accordingly, the Court held, "[t]he
advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to
the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a generous
understanding of the concept."170 Rather, the effect of the funding restriction
was to curtail private speech, that is, to "insulate current welfare laws from
constitutional scrutiny and certain other legal challenges, [thereby] implicating
central First Amendment concerns."17 ' The funding restrictions were therefore
subject to the traditional First Amendment prohibition of viewpoint discrimination and found unconstitutional. 172
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum17 1 is the Court's most recent government speech case. Summum involved a public park containing fifteen
167. See id at 548 ("[I]n the context of [the LSC] statute there is no [governmental] message of the
kind recognized in Rust and which sufficed there to allow the Government to specify the advice
deemed necessary for its legitimate objectives. This serves to distinguish [it] from any of
the . . .restrictions upheld in Rust .

168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.at541-42.
Id at 542.
Id at 542-43.
Id.at 547.
172. Id at 548-49 (holding that "[w]here private speech is involved, even Congress'..

. funding
decision[s] cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government's own
interest").
173. 129 S. Ct. 1125, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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permanent displays, of which at least eleven were donated to the park by private
persons or groups. 1 4 The monuments included historical items, such as an
historic granary, the city's first fire station, and a September 11th monument, as
well as a Ten Commandments monument that the Fraternal Order of Eagles
donated in 1971.175 Summum, a religious organization, wished to donate a
monument containing its "Seven Aphorisms," which were religious tenets."'
The proposed monument was to be "similar in size and nature" to the existing
Ten Commandments monument.177 The city refused Summum's donation, citing its policy that monuments in the park were limited to those relating to the
city's history or donated by groups with "longstanding ties" to the community.178
Summum sued, alleging that the city violated the Free Speech Clause by
distinguishing between the religious monuments that it would accept-the Ten
Commandments-and those that it would reject-the Seven Aphorismsbased on content and/or the speaker's identity.17 ' The Court rejected this claim,
holding that the display of permanent monuments in a public park on city-owned
property fell within the government speech doctrine." The Court stated that a
government entity "has the right to speak for itself [and] is entitled to say what
it wishes, and to select the views that it wants to express. Indeed, it is not easy
to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom." 8
Although the Summum Court did not embrace a single bright-line rule, it
unanimously held that the monument display had the attributes of government
speech. While admitting "there may be situations in which it is difficult to tell
whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf,"182 the Court found
that it was dear that the placement of monuments in the park amounted to government speech. The Court held that visitors to the park would likely perceive the
monuments as expressing a government message and that the government in

174. Idat1129.
175. Id
176. Id at 1129-30. Although Summum had Establishment Clause overtones, the only issue before
the Court was the Free Speech Clause claim. See id at 1130 (noting that after losing in the
district court, "[Summum] appealed, pressing solely its free speech claim").
177. Idat 1129.
178. Id atl1130.
179. Id atl1129-30.
180. Id at 1134 ("In this case, it is dear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove's Pioneer Park
represent government speech."); see also id at 1131 ("If [the city and local officials] were engaging
in their own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application.").
181. Id at 1131 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Idatl1132.
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fact established and fily controlled that message.' 83 Accordingly, the Court
found the government speech exception satisfied.
B.

Applying the Speech Paradigm to Government Race Consciousness

While the government speech doctrine has been criticized,' 84 this Article
takes the doctrine as it stands and demonstrates its relevance to the Court's
colorblindness jurisprudence. This Subpart first addresses how government action
of the kind at issue in Shaw, Parents Involved, and Ricci can be considered a
form of symbolic speech. It then applies government speech principles to specific
examples of government race consciousness.
1. Race Consciousness as Expressive Conduct
The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause only prohibits abridgment of
"speech."' 5 It is well established, however, that the First Amendment also
applies to symbolic speech or expressive conduct."' The First Amendment,
does not, however, protect all conduct that has an expressive component. 8 7
The Court has identified three factors to be considered in determining whether
conduct has a sufficient expressive component to be treated as speech:
(1) whether the conduct was performed with "[a]n intent to convey a

183. See id at 1132-37 (noting, inter alia, that the city exercised complete authority over the contents
of the park and that governments have historically used public monuments to express government
messages and have done so selectively).
184. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG
2D 413, 427 (2009) (critiquing the government speech doctrine because it could lead the government to engage in "blatant viewpoint discrimination simply by adopting private speech as its
own"); Steven G. Gey, Why Should the FirstAmendment Protect Government Speech When the
Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOwA L. REV. 1259, 1262-63 (2010) (criticizing the government speech doctrine, and arguing, inter alia, that "it is unclear ... why the government should
have the affirmative First Amendment right to speak, since the structural function of the Past
Amendment is to limit government power"); Norton & Citron, supra note 150, at 917 (criticizing
the doctrine for its lack ofclarity, and stating that "the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a clear rule
for parsing government from private speech," thereby leading to confusion in the lower courts).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (stating that "[t]he First
Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of speech" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
186. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (finding flag burning to be expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment, and stating that the Court has "long recognized that [the First Amendment's]
protection does not end at the spoken or written word. .. . [and] we have acknowledged that
conduct may be sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of
the First [Amendment]" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
187. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (stating that the Court's cases "reject the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled speech whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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particularized message;"' (2) whether "the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it;"' 89 (3) in light of the context in
Thus, the test for expressive conduct contains
which the conduct occurred.'
the latter of which is to be assessed
elements,
subjective and objective
contextually.
Much has been written about the expressive function and social meaning
of the law.' 91 One can think of government action as existing along a spectrum
in terms of expressive content, from those laws that are almost purely
instrumental to those that are almost solely expressive. Laws that prohibit
running red lights-a classic malum prohibitum scenario, in which the
prohibition serves the purely instrumental purpose of regulating traffic flowhave no significant expressive component. No moral condemnation or other
expressive content attaches to the prohibition. In contrast, consider a law that
prohibits non-Christian displays in a city's public square. The government
action is almost wholly expressive; it serves no instrumental purpose.' 92 The
resultant Establishment Clause harm would be dignitary or expressive in nature.
The fact that some government action has an expressive component,
however, does not mean that all such government action will be considered

188. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
190. See id at 405 ("We have not automatically concluded ... that any action taken with respect to our
flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have
considered the context in which it occurred."); see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410
(1974) (holding that, in applying the expressive conduct analysis, "the context in which a symbol is
used for purposes of expression is important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol").
191. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 1533 ("[E]xpressive considerations ... apply
throughout much of American constitutionalism."); Deborah L. Brake, Wben Equality Leaves
Everyone Worse Off The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
513, 579 (2004) ("[T]he expressive force of law and other government action shapes social
meaning [and] this influence on social meaning may affect individual and collective behavior
wholly apart from the sanctions of law enforcement."); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995) ("Any society or social context has. . . social
meanings-the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a
particular context."); Primus, supra note 65, at 1347 ("Symbolism and social meaning have always
shaped the law of equal protection . . . ."); Cass R Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021,2051 (1996) (There can be no doubt that law, like action in general,
has an expressive function. .. . Many debates over the appropriate content of law are really debates
over the statement that law makes, independent of its (direct) consequences.").
192. Maximizing the use of limited public space in the way the government believes best could be characterized as an instrumental purpose. But the government would be basing its judgment about
the best use of public space on the expressive value of non-Christian displays. Cf Pleasant Grove
City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139, 1134, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (noting that, in
deciding what monuments to display on limited public land, "[g]overnment decisionmakers select
the monuments that portray what they view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into
account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture").
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expressive conduct under the First Amendment. First Amendment analysis
requires sensitive and value-laden judgments as to whether certain expression
should be treated as speech.'
The approach this Article suggests would
therefore require a case-by-case determination of whether particular government action is expressive conduct under the First Amendment.
Applying the expressive conduct analysis to the facts of the Court's strict
colorblindness cases is revealing. Recall that Ricci v. DeStefano94 involved the
efforts of public officials to prevent a racially disparate impact with regard to
who would be eligible for promotion to supervisory positions in the New Haven
fire department. The officials put all promotions on hold until they could
develop an alternative process that would not create such a disparate impact.
The facts revealed three reasons for the city officials' actions. First, they sought
to avoid legal liability: They believed the disparate impact would violate Title
VI. 9s Second, they were concerned about distributive justice: They believed it
was substantively unfair to needlessly exclude racial minorities from the higher
pay and greater prestige of supervisory positions. 96 Third, they were concerned
about the symbolic legitimacy of the safety forces: They wished to avoid the
perception of racial inequity created by a situation where "New Haven, a city in
which African-Americans and Hispanics account for nearly 60 percent of the
population, [would] be served-as it was in the days of undisguised discrimination-by a fire department in which members of racial and ethnic minorities
are rarely seen in command positions."'
The expressive conduct analysis first asks whether the conduct at issue was
performed with an intent to convey a specific message. Expressive concerns dearly
motivated the city's actions. For example, the district court in Ricci made the following findings of fact:
[The city's actions were motivated by] the following concems: that the
test had a statistically adverse impact on African-American and Hispanic

193. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITITflONAL LAW 1208 (3d ed. 2009) ("Because even for
originalists there is little guidance from history or the framers' intent as to the meaning of the First
Amendment [beyond the prohibition on prior restraints and rejection of the crime of seditious
libel], the Supreme Court inescapably must make value choices as to what speech is protected.").
194. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
195. Id at 2695 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing city officials' concerns that "[e]ven if the exams
were 'facially neutral,' significant doubts had been raised about whether they properly assessed the
key attributes of a successful fire officer," thereby potentially leading to disparate impact liability).
196. Id at 2670 (majority opinion) (citing city officials' concerns that going forward with promotions
would result in "black and Hispanic candidates [being] disproportionately excluded from
opportunity" and that "there [were] more appropriate ways to assess one's ability to serve as a
captain or lieutenant" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
197. Id at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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examinees; that promoting off of this list would undermine theirgoal of
diversity in the Fire Department and wouldfail to develop managerial

role models for aspiring firefighters; that it would subject the City to
public criticism; and that it would likely subject the City to Tide VII
lawsuits from minority applicants that, for political reasons, the City
did not want to defend. 198
The appearance of diversity, the visibility of role models, and the desire to
avoid public criticism and remain in the favor of an important political
constituency 99 are all expressive in nature. Thus, the city's intent to communicate certain messages was dearly critical in its decision.

Moreover, Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Ricci made much of the fact
that, in his view, the city refused to certify the test results not for the instrumental purpose of avoiding Title VII liability but instead for expressive reasons-to
please the black community because an influential African American pastor had
illegitimately "captured" the political process.200 Additionally, as the majority
opinion recognized, the issue of the representativeness of the fire department
was so contentious precisely because "firefighters prize their promotion to and
within the officer ranks [and] an agency's officers command respect within the
department and in the whole community."201

The expressive conduct analysis next requires an assessment of whether
"the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it' 02 in light of the context.203 The question of an audience's comprehension
198. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 162 (D. Conn. 2006) (emphasis added).
199. I do not suggest that government action should be insulated from equal protection scrutiny simply
because it is undertaken to avoid public criticism or retain the favor of voters. To the contrary, in
cases where such actions result in unequal treatment, subordination, or stigma, I would argue that
they do implicate the Equal Protection Clause. See, eg, Benjamin Schwarz, Insidious Weakness,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1998, http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/98may/weak
htm (discussing the career of Orval Faubus, governor of Arkansas during the Little Rock school
integration crisis in 1957, and stating that his actions in opposing the integration of Little Rock
Central High School were largely motivated by political expediency and electoral concerns). As
discussed in Part II, however, I do not believe that the city's actions in Ricci resulted in unequal
treatment, subordination, or stigma.
200. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2685 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the city's actions were not truly
intended to avoid disparate impact liability, but that instead one could "infer that city officials
worked behind the scenes to sabotage the promotional examinations because they knew that, were
the exams certified, the Mayor would incur the wrath of [Reverend] Kimber and other influential
leaders of New Haven's African-American community" (quoting Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 162)).
Justice Alito's imagery of radical black "wrath" and "sabotage" was both unfairly pejorative and
unnecessarily inflammatory (pun intended). The characterization of the black community's successfil political advocacy as amounting to sinister subversion of the political process falsely equated
"political considerations with unlawful discrimination." Id. at 2709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201. Id at 2664 (majority opinion).
202. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
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of a message is complex. The social meaning of a message can be defined as "the
meaning that a competent participant in the society in question would see in
that event or expression."204 But equally competent audiences can reasonably
take different messages from the same communication or expressive act.205
Moreover, the necessary consideration of the context in which the communication takes place fiurther complicates the question.206 Nonetheless, it is likely that
all of the relevant audiences207 in New Haven would have understood that the
city was expressing a message of racial egalitarianism by its refusal to certify test
results that would exacerbate a visible racial disparity between the supervised
and their supervisors. 208

203. SeeSpence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410 (1974).
204. Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause Limits After
Summum, 19 WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 1,52 (2010) (quoting CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER
& LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 127 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
205. The critical race theory insight of perspectivalism, for example, insists that race, culture, gender,
sexual orientation, political affiliation, and other group identities should matter a great deal in
determining social meaning. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 55 (2001). The insight that one's mode of cognition may
be strongly affected by group identity is not limited to critical race theorists. For example, a recent
empirical study reveals substantial group differences in the perceived meaning of the same
communication. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of a police officer who was sued for ending a high-speed chase by ramming his
police car into the fleeing vehicle, causing serious injuries to the suspect. The Court found, based
on a video recording of the chase, that "no reasonable juror" could believe other than that the
decision to use deadly force was justified. In the study, the same video was shown to a diverse group
of approximately 1350 laypeople. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman,
Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
HARV. L. REv. 837 (2009). The study found, inter alia, that when shown the video, substantial
majorities agreed with the Court's resolution of the facts, but that "African Americans, lowincome workers, and residents of the Northeast, for example, tended to form more pro-plaintiff
views of the facts than did the Court. So did individuals who characterized themselves as liberals
and Democrats." Id at 841.
206. A straightforward example is the difference in meaning likely to be ascribed to a common racial
epithet when uttered in the context of, for example, a rap song, versus a stranger of a different race
directing the same word at an African American personally. Similarly, it is likely that a different
meaning would be ascribed to a swastika viewed as part of a documentary about World War II
than one spray-painted on the wall of a synagogue. For a sophisticated examination of the role of
context in ascribing social meaning to government action, see generally B. Jessie Hill, Putting
Religious Symbolism in Context:A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV.
491 (2005).
207. There were at least four relevant audiences in Ricci: black and Latino residents of the city, black
and Latino rank-and-file firefighters; white residents; and white rank-and-file firefighters.
208. As discussed infau in notes 224-231 and accompanying text, the matter of whether to make the
promotions in Ricci was widely debated in New Haven prior to the decision being made, and
various city officials communicated their concerns regarding the racial disparity.

Affirmative Action

41

The reaction to this message was in large part the reason why the
disappointed firefighters fought the city all the way to the Supreme Court.
The message of racial egalitarianism conflicted with their fundamental beliefs
about liberal individualism. For example, in his testimony at Justice Sotomayor's
U.S. Senate confirmation hearings, Frank Ricci, the lead plaintiff in Ricci, criticized the Second Circuit's opinion upholding the city's actions, stating that
"[t]he lower court's belief that citizens should be reduced to racial statistics is
flawed. It only divides people who don't wish to be divided along racial lines." 209
He continued, "When we finally won our case [at the Supreme Court] and saw
the messages we received from every corner of the country, we understood that
we did something important together. We sought basic fairness and evenhanded
enforcement of the laws, something all Americans believe in."210 By contrast,
given the history and context of racial exclusion in fire, police, and other safety
forces nationally as well as in New Haven,211 it seems likely that black and Latino
firefighters and residents of the city would have understood the city's action as
expressing a message of racial inclusion and the disavowal of the exclusionary
policies of the past.212
Similarly, the school boards' actions in ParentsInvolved are amenable to an
expressive conduct analysis. The boards had at least two purposes in adopting
their policies. First, the boards sought to maintain integrated schools as a
means of achieving the educational goal of cross-racial socialization, following
the reasoning of Justice Marshall's admonition in Milliken v. Bradley that
"unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people

209. Transcript, Frank Ricci Testifies at Sonia Sotomayor's Confirmation Hearings, WASH. POST, July 16,
2009, httpi//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/16/AR2009071603090.htl.i
210. Id.
211. See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing
Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 88-89 (2010) (describing this history, and noting that New
Haven "had been repeatedly and successfully sued by African Americans and Latinos over its
hiring and promotional practices-virtually all facially race neutral-that operated to shut
nonwhites out..... [and that o]vert and intentional racial exclusion and segregation remained
pervasive in many urban fire departments even decades after Brown"); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v.
DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 588-95 (2010)
(tracing the history of exclusion of white women and racial minorities from firefighting jobs
in New Haven and other urban fire departments and the resultant desegregation and discrimination lawsuits).
212. See, eg, Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 150 (D. Conn. 2006) (Plaintiffs' theory is that
[city officials] urged the [civil service board] not to certify' the results in the interest of pleasing
minority voters and other constituents in New Haven whose priority was increasing racial diversity
in the ranks of the Fire Department.").
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will ever learn to live together."213 Second, the boards sought to convey a
message by the actions taken to maintain integration. As the Seattle school
board's website stated at the time, the board believed that the "emphasizing [of]
individualism as opposed to a more collective ideology" is a form of "cultural
racism" and stated that the district had no intention "to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as [a] . . . colorblind mentality."214 In short, a message of

racial egalitarianism triumphed over the competing messages of colorblindness
and/or liberal individualism in the court of public opinion in Seattle, as expressed
in the policies of its school board. Indeed, the Supreme Court quoted the
foregoing language "in contrast"215 to the Court's preferred message that "[a]t
the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class." 216
As in Ricci, the context of Parents Involved makes it highly likely that the
relevant audiences understood the school boards' messages. That context
involved the Seattle and Louisville school districts' struggles to prevent school
resegregation, due to the long history and continued effects of de jure and de
facto school and residential segregation in those cities.21 7 In Seattle, as noted
above, the school board's message was stated explicitly in official communications, making it unlikely that it could be misunderstood, either by supporters or
opponents. In Louisville, the community largely rallied behind the school
integration plan,218 in support of the message sent by the state's reputation,

213. 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725 (2007) (plurality opinion) ("Each school district argues that
educational and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning environment.").
214. 551 U.S. at 731 n.14 (second alteration in original) (quoting the board's website).
215. Id
216. Id at 730 (alterations in original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
217. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1225
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (upholding Seattle's school assignment plan, and finding that "[flor over
thirty years the Seattle School District has made efforts to ameliorate the often pernicious
consequences of the racial isolation in its schools that would, but for those efforts, track the racial
segregation of the city's housing patterns"), rev'd and remanded, 551 U.S. 701; Hampton v.
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755-67 (W.D. Ky. 1999) (describing in detail
the history of segregation in Louisville public schools).
218. For example, a 2001 survey found that over 80 percent of parents in the Louisville/Jefferson
County school district supported the desegregation plan at issue in Parents Involved. Chris
Kenning, Supreme Court to Heareferson's School Suit, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., June 6, 2006, at
Al; seealso Meaghan Hines, Note, Fulfilling the Promise ofBrown? What Parents Involved Means
for Louisville and the Future of Race in Public Education, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2173, 2218
(2008) (citing local news reports and letters to newspapers for the proposition that "many Jefferson
County parents and students demonstrated their disappointment after [the Supreme Court's
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and the city's image in particular, as one of the most integrated areas for blacks
in the country.21 9
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, race-conscious government action
220
will often be sufficiently communicative to be considered expressive conduct.
Indeed, given that the Court's strict colorblindness cases speak primarily in terms
of expressive harms, those cases implicitly assume that such action is primarily
expressive. The next Part of this Article analyzes such action using government
speech principles.
2. Race Consciousness as Government Speech: Application
At this point, the premise of this Article bears repeating: When the
government's race consciousness does not result in the redistribution of limited
resources, disparate treatment, subordination, or other racialized tangible harm,
any harm at issue is primarily expressive. NWhen race-conscious government
action allegedly inflicts harm that is primarily expressive and nonstigmatic, First
Amendment principles should inform the equal protection analysis. Because
such messages regarding the continued salience of race are both generated by
and subject to correction through the political process, government speech
principles counsel against allowing individuals to transform their disagreements
with those messages into constitutional claims. 221
In determining when the government speech doctrine applies, the Court
has considered the degree of government control over the message and whether
222 Both
listeners would be likely to attribute the message to the government.
factors are present in cases like Ricci, ParentsInvolved, and Shaw. When the government undertakes a race-conscious policy such as public school integration,

219.
220.

221.

222.

ruling in ParentsInvolved], imploring the school district to continue its efforts to instill its students
with an appreciation for diversity").
See Hines, supra note 209, at 2218 (stating that Louisville's busing policy had been "lauded as the
source of Kentucky's 2001 status as the most integrated state for blacks").
For the sake of length, I have purposefully omitted an expressive conduct analysis of Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993). Suffice it to say that (1) the Court treated the case as one involving solely an
expressive harm, and (2) 1 believe the redistricting in Shaw had sufficient expressive content to meet
the expressive conduct test.
This Article does not take a position as to whether individuals in such circumstances should ever
have standing to sue. Rather, even assuming that an expressive harm is sufficient to confer
standing under the Equal Protection Clause, this Article argues that such claims should fail on the
merits in the circumstances described herein, subject to the limitations discussed in Part II.B.3,
infra. This is consistent with the Court's analysis in cases such as Rust and Summum, wherein the
Court found (or assumed) standing but held that the plaintiffs' claims failed because of the government speech doctrine.
See, e g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132-37, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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diversification of a public fire department, or the establishment of blackmajority voting districts, the government fully controls such action.
Moreover, unlike a case such as Summum, in which the government incorporated private speech into its own message, there is no risk of misattribution of
the message. The speech is clearly the government's own. Additionally, the
underlying rationales for the government speech doctrine apply with equal
force to the Court's strict colorblindness cases. Government entities, such as
school boards, legislatures, and municipalities, should be able to express
messages and take positions regarding racial equality, just as they routinely
do regarding other contentious matters of social policy.223 To the extent that
individuals disagree with such messages, they can use the political process to
change them.
To take one example, applying government speech principles to the
facts of Ricci would result in the city's actions being upheld. As discussed
fully above, one of the primary rationales for the government speech doctrine is
that when an individual's primary objection to government action is grounded in
disagreement with the message such action sends, the proper remedy is to change
the government speech through the political process rather than through the
courts. It is dear that the political process actually functioned properly in Ricci.
Government officials made the decision not to certify the test results by
taking into account the kinds of input from citizens that are the workings of
ordinary politics. New Haven's procedures required that the Civil Service Board
(CSB) certify a list of applicants who would be eligible for civil service positions. Once the controversy over the test results erupted, the CSB, which is an

223.

Examples include messages regarding abortion, war, drug policy, homosexuality, and religion. See,
e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593-94 (2007) (quoting the
Executive Order establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
for the purpose of ensuring that "private and charitable community groups, including religious
ones ... have the fullest opportunity permitted by law to compete on a level playing field [for
federal funds]"); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (abortion); Andy Birkey, Minneapolis City
Council Passes Resolution Denouncing Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill, MINN. INDEP., Dec.
18, 2009, http//minnesotaindependent.com/52186/minneapolis-city-council-passes-resolutiondenouncing-ugandas-anti-homosexuality-bill (describing a city council resolution opposing a
Ugandan bill that would impose harsh criminal penalties for homosexual conduct); Bloomington
Resolutions Oppose Iraq War, PatriotAct, Seek Higher Minimum Wage, DEMOCRAcY NOW, May
6, 2005, http://www.democracynow.org/2005/5/6/bloomingtonresolutionsopposeJiraqwar
patriot (discussing municipal resolution opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq); Scott Mobley, Redding
Council Votes to Oppose Legalizing Marijuana, REDDING RECORD-SEARCHLIGHT, Aug. 3,
2010, http//www.redding.com/news/2010/aug/03/redng-council-votes-oppose-legalizing-marjuana
(discussing a city resolution opposing California Proposition 19, which would have legalized
possession of marijuana).
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"autonomous body of City of New Haven citizens," 224 held a series of five open
hearings at which members of the public as well as government officials spoke
for and against certifying the results. 225 The CSB heard testimony "from test
takers, the test designer, subject-matter experts, City officials, union leaders, and
community members,"" including individuals and organized interest groups,
such as the International Association of Black Professional Firefighters. In
addition to the transparency of the process, the matter was in public view and
227 Moreover, the city's
part of the public discourse in New Haven at the time.
Board of Aldermen (the elected city council) was briefed on the situation,
228 In short,
providing another outlet for community input and participation.
Ricci involved a public matter roundly debated in public fora that provided
opportunities for democratic engagement. At the end of the process, democratically accountable officials took a position on a political controversy.
The political process in Ricci also likely would have been perceived as
functioning properly. The disappointed firefighters did not claim that the city's
action stigmatized them, nor were they or their allies effectively shut out of the
political process. Whites were well represented in city government and the final
decision on certification-a 2-2 split by the CSB-belies the impression of
229 It may be true that
minority subversion or capture of the city government.
224.

Civil Service, CITY OF NEW HAVEN HUMAN RESOURCES, http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/

HumanResources/CivilService.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
225. See Joint Appendix, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328)
(providing transcripts of the hearings). Notably, these hearings were held over the initial protest
of Reverend Kimber, who apparently would have preferred that the Board of Fire Commissioners
first have the opportunity to meet privately with the CSB. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2685 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (stating that "Reverend Kimber protested the public meeting, arguing that he and the
other fire commissioners should first be allowed to meet with the CSB in private"). This fact does
much to dispel the notion that the process operated through secret back-room dealing.
226. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing the hearings).
227. For example, the issue was thoroughly covered in the local media. See, e.g., William Kaempffer &
Angela Carter, City Fire Tests Have No Easy, Cheap Fix, NEW HAVEN REG., Feb. 2, 2004,
27
1
http://www.nhregister.com/artides/2004/02/02/import/ 09015 .txt William Kaempffer, Fire
REG., Feb. 6, 2004, http//
HAVEN
NEW
Exams,
Department Sure to Be Sued Over
109274 6
2
0 .txt [hereinafter Kaempffer, Fire
www.nhregister.com/artides/2004/0 /06l/import/
Department Sure to Be Sued]; William Kaempffer, Fire Exams Pose Problems, City Lawyer Says,
3
NEw HAVEN REG., Jan. 23, 2004, http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2004/01/2 /import/

10855004.txt, William Kaempffer, FirefightersSay Testsfor PromotionsAre Flawed, NEW HAVEN
2
0
REG., Jan. 21, 2004, http://www.nhregister.com/articles/20 4/01/ 1/iiport/ 10840559.txt.
aldermen to the situation).
of
reaction
the
(describing
227
note
supra
Carter,
&
228. See Kaempffer
229. At the time of the decision regarding whether to certify the test results, the CSB had three white
members, one Latino member, and one black member. See Kaempffer, Fire Department Sure to Be
Sued, supra note 227. The one black member was recused from the hearings and the vote because
her brother was a New Haven firefighter and a candidate for promotion. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554
F. Supp. 2d 142, 150 n.5 (D. Conn. 2006). The New Haven Board of Aldermen at that time was
comprised of twelve white members, twelve black members, five Latino members, and one Asian
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blacks and Latinos were "a politically important racial constituency"23 o in New
Haven, that a local black minister apparently had the ear of the mayor, 231 and
that city officials and the CSB were persuaded for political reasons not to certify
the test results. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how these facts could amount to
a systemic defect in New Haven's democratic processes, unless successfil political advocacy is grounds for judicial suspicion. The allegedly offensive message
expressed by the city's actions in Ricci was amenable to correction through
democratic means. Government speech principles would therefore counsel that
concerns about the social meaning of the city's actions be left to the democratic process.
Looking forward, the approach suggested in this Article should be
applied in future cases where individuals claim nonstigmatizing expressive harm
from race-conscious government action. For example, the federal census and
similar state procedures have been attacked for violating equal protection
because they collect racial data. From a strict colorblindness perspective, it is
irrelevant that collecting such information is vital to enforcing antidiscrimination laws and addressing racial disparities in areas such as health and
education.232 Nor would it matter that collecting such information does not
inflict a tangible injury on any individual. Under the strict colorblindness
doctrine, such measures would be considered constitutionally suspect simply
because they are race conscious.23 The colorblindness doctrine, taken to its
member. Telephone Interview by Jonathan Mayer With Albert Lucas, Dir. of the Office of
Legislative Servs. for New Haven, Conn. (July 28, 2011).
230. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2688 (Alito,J., concurring).
231. Idat 2684.
232. Among other matters, racial and ethnic data is used by the Justice Department to make determinations about compliance with the Voting Rights Act and by private plaintiffs in Voting Rights Act
litigation. See Recommendations From the Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and
Ethnic Standards to the Office ofManagement and Budget Concerning Changes to the Standardsfor the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, July 9, 1997,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/Directive_15.html (explaining that claims
of vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and requests for preclearance under
Section 5 of the Act for changes to voting procedures "are usually determined by reference to
decennial census data on race and ethnicity"); Language Use: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, httpi//www.census.gov/hhes/socdemoAanguage/about/faqs.html (last updated
Nov. 15, 2010) (explaining that "[o]ne of the main purposes of collecting information on languages is for Voting Rights determination [and i]nformation about languages spoken at home and
English-speaking ability is used to determine bilingual election requirements under the Voting
Rights Act"). Such information is also used to determine compliance with various provisions of the
federal No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006). See, e.g., id. § 6301(3) (stating
that a purpose of the Act is "closing the achievement gap between high- and low-performing
children, especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students").
233. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 34, at 1470-71 (discussing the 2003 "Racial Privacy Initiative"
(Proposition 54) in California, which would have prohibited the state from collecting data on race,
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logical conclusion, similarly threatens a variety of other government programs,
such as minority outreach programs 234 or government data collection to ident
racial disparities, 235 that are race conscious but do not operate to disadvantage or
stigmatize nonminorities.

ethnicity, color, or national origin); Alex Seitz-Wald, Beck- The Census Is the Government'sAttempt
3 9
to increase Slavery,'T"HINKPROGRESS.ORG, Mar. 9, 2010, http://thinkprogress.org/2010/0 /0 /
of
collection
to
the
opposition
commentator's
television
beck-census-slavery (discussing a popular
census data regarding respondents' race). Lest the reader believe that opposition to the collection
of such data is far-fetched or limited to fringe opinion, it is worth noting that supporters of
Proposition 54 couched their arguments explicitly in constitutional terms and that the measure,
although defeated, was supported by a third of the voters. See Siegel, supra note 34, at 1470-71
(quoting press releases and other public statements by Proposition 54's supporters to contend that
they "[s]ummon[ed] Thurgood Marshall's arguments in Brown, the legacy of Martin Luther
King, Jr., and the memory of slavery and segregation, [in arguing] that the anticassification
commitments of Brown required an end to the kind of racial data collection that has long been
used to enforce the nation's antidiscrimination laws"); see also Ritu Kelotra, Civil Rights Groups:
Proposition 54 Defeat Is Victory for All, LEADERSHIP CONF., Oct. 8. 2003, http://www.
4
civilrights.org/equal-opportunity/proposition-5 /civil-rights-groups-proposition-54-defeat-isvictory-for-all.html (noting that the measure was defeated 64 to 36 percent).
234. See, e.g., Minority and Women Outreach Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.
gov/buying/goods/mwop/index.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2009) (describing the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's Minority and Women Outreach Program, which seeks to "ensure the
inclusion, to the maximum extent possible, of minorities and women ... in all contracts entered into
by the FDIC" by providing outreach, education, and networking for firms owned by minorities
and women); Brent Staples, Editorial, The Country Can Learn a Lesson From These Students, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2010, at A26 (discussing the Annual Biomedical Research Conference for
Minority Students, which is sponsored by the National Institute of General Medical Sciences (a
division of the federal National Institutes of Health) and aims to increase the participation of
underrepresented racial minorities in the sciences). The threat to such programs from a strict
colorblindness principle is not hypothetical. In Hi- Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12
P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000), the California Supreme Court held that a city program mandating that
government contractors conduct minority and women's outreach violated California Proposition
209, which generally forbids government consideration of race. The court stated that the program
illegally required contractors to treat minority and women subcontractors "more advantageously by
providing them notice of bidding opportunities, soliciting their participation, and negotiating for
their services, none of which they must do for non-[minority or women subcontractors]. The fact
that prime contractors are not precluded from contacting non-[women or minority firms] is
irrelevant." Id. at 1084; see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial
Prefrences, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1144 n.19 (2008) (noting that the University of California
ended various minority outreach programs after the enactment of California Proposition 209).
235. For example, in order to detect racial profiling, many states require the collection of racial data on
traffic stops and other law enforcement encounters. See Paul Heaton, Understandingthe Effects of
Antprofiling Policies, 53 J.L. & ECON. 29, 29 (2010) ("By 2007, a total of 25 states had enacted
legislation requiring police agencies to collect data on the race of motorists involved in traffic stops,
with selected police departments in 22 other states voluntarily agreeing to collect such data.").
Similarly, Executive Order 12,898, issued by President Clinton, requires federal
agencies to make environmental justice part of their mission "by identifying and
addressing .. . disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of
[their programs] on minority populations .. "3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995).
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All of these measures, like the government action in Shaw, Ricci, and
Parents Involved, involve government race consciousness. None of them, like
Shaw, Ricci, and Parents Involved, cause tangible harm, inflict stigma, or

distribute limited resources unequally.236 Such programs do, through the government's attentiveness to continued racial disparities and exclusion, contradict
postracialism. Rather than seeing these programs as discrimination against
whites, the theory of this Article would hold that the analysis of such programs
should be informed by First Amendment principles. Under those principles,
objection to the expressive content of such government action would not by
itself state a constitutional claim.
3. Race Consciousness as Government Speech: Limitations
The government speech doctrine is not and should not be without
limitation, either generally or specifically in the context of race-conscious
government action. Several limitations on the government speech doctrine are
especially pertinent to the theory of this Article. The first is that the government
speech doctrine does not apply when the government's expression violates some
constitutional provision other than the First Amendment.237 There is therefore
an apparent tautology: The government speech doctrine does not apply when
the government's action violates another constitutional provision, and the strict
colorblindness doctrine holds that government expression of racial messages
always violates the Equal Protection Clause. As discussed earlier,238 however, the
expressive content of race-conscious government action traditionally has not
been sufficient by itself to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. The
Equal Protection Clause therefore should not preclude the use of government
speech principles in such cases. Moreover, this Article is not arguing that cases
236.

It is of course true that in a world of limited resources, every dollar spent on, for example, minority
outreach programs, enforcement of civil rights laws, or collecting data to monitor racial
discrimination and disparities could be spent elsewhere. But generalized grievances regarding
government spending priorities are generally nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737 (1984) (holding that parents of African American public school students lacked standing to
bring a claim alleging that the IRS improperly failed to terminate tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools). When I speak of distributing limited resources, I have in mind
discrete decisions regarding allocation of a specific government resource to one person rather than
another, such as admission of certain students to a university, or the award of a particular
government benefit (for example, employment or government funds) to a specific individual.
237. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Sumnmum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("[E]ven if the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects government
speech, government speakers are bound by the Constitution's other proscriptions, including those
supplied by the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.").
238. See sura PartlI.
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involving objections to the social meaning of positive government race
consciousness be analyzed under the formal doctrinal rubric of the government
speech doctrine. Rather, this Article argues that the principles and policies of
the government speech doctrine should be incorporated into equal protection
doctrine in such cases. Thus, equal protection would not act as an external check
on the government speech doctrine; instead, government speech principles
would inform and moderate the colorblindness doctrine.
Incorporating government speech principles into equal protection analysis
would not be appropriate, however, when the government acts in a raceconscious manner to distribute benefits or engage in actual differential treatment,
or when the expressive content of the government's action causes racial
stigmatization. As stated at the beginning of this Article, the theory posited
here would not apply in cases involving the race-conscious and zero-sum distri239
bution of inherently limited resources, such as money or seats at a university.
Second, using government speech principles to inform equal protection
doctrine would be inappropriate when the message at issue is not in fact the government's own or would not reasonably be perceived as the government's own.
When, for example, the government's speech has been captured (or would
reasonably be perceived as captured) by private parties, government speech
principles should not apply. Thus, if it were true in Ricci-which it was not-that
city officials declined to make any promotions because the allegedly subversive
black minister evoked by Justice Alito's concurrence24 0 had illegitimately
captured the political process, then government speech principles would have
no place in the analysis. The government speech doctrine only exempts the
government's speech from First Amendment scrutiny when it is truly and trans241
parently the government's own, generated through normal political processes.
Additionally, the approach this Article advocates should not apply when the
message sent by race-conscious government action is alleged to have a significant injurious effect beyond or in addition to expressive harm. For example,
239. Thus, while I believe that cases such as Adarand, Gratz, and Bakke were incorrectly decided, I do
not quarrel with the applicability of traditional equal protection doctrine in such cases.
240. See supra Part III.B.1, discussing Justice Alito's concurrence in Ricci.
241. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 ("A government entity has the right to speak for itself It is
entitled to say what it wishes, and to select the views that it wants to express." (emphasis added)
(citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted)); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("We have said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained
in instances in which the government is itself the speaker. .. ."). Moreover, as discussed earlier,
the political process rationale for the government speech doctrine also implicitly requires that it be
clear that the speech is the government's. See Lee, supra note 160, at 988-89 (arguing that the government speech doctrine should only apply where it is transparent that the government is the
speaker); Norton 8&Citron, supra note 150, at 902, 936 (same).
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certain government messages can be so racially silencing or hostile that they
have the effect of excluding a group from the very political processes that could
change the message. Government hate speech can carry a sufficiently strong
social meaning of official racial hostility that members of certain racial groups
are effectively excluded from participation in the political process. Thus, some
scholars have argued that prominent and official government displays of the
Confederate Flag violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments because of
their racially exclusionary effect.242 In such cases, the message creates the kind
of process defect traditionally justifying strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.24 3 That same process defect would also undermine one of
the primary rationales for the government speech doctrine-that the objectionable speech is generated by and subject to correction through political
processes in which the objecting individuals can fully participate.244 No
such racial silencing or process defect is apparent in the Court's strict
colorblindness cases.
IV.

BENEFITS OF THE SPEECH PARADIGM IN ANALYZING
RACE-CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT ACTION

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the Court's strict
colorblindness cases are based on notions of the expressive harms caused by government action in contradiction to postracialism. This final Part addresses on its

242. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols:A ThirteenthAmendmentApproach, 75
TEMP. L. REv. 539, 609 (2002) (arguing that "[t]he civil rights gained through the Reconstruction
Amendments ... trump government speech" because "the incorporation of Confederate imagery
into state symbolism . . . draws meaning from a history in which the Confederacy stifled the voices
of blacks and abolitionists"); James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the
Confederate Flag From Southern State Capitals, 101 YALE L.. 505, 515 (1991) (stating that
"[t]he selection of an exclusionary symbol to fly above the state capitol is harmful in part because
of the effect it may have on the desire and ability of the excluded to participate in the political and
legal processes"); f Sarabyn, supra note 47, at 559 (positing the following hypothetical: "Consider
if Congress established a policy of donning [Ku] Klux Klan outfits for official business. This policy
expresses a belief in white supremacy... and the policy poses no physical or behavioral harm to
black citizens. Yet, it appears to violate the command of equal protection" because of its social
meaning and effect.").
243. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (recognizing without
deciding that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
244. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("When the
government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in
the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy.").
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own merits the benefits of using First Amendment principles to inform the
Court's strict colorblindness doctrine.
There are both benefits and dangers to constitutional borrowing, that is, the
practice of transplanting legal doctrines developed in one area of constitutional
law into another.24 5 Although a full examination of constitutional borrowing is
beyond the scope of this Article, some of the risks include intellectual incoherence,u246unprincipled selectivity in deciding what and when to borrow,24 7 and
possible unintended or unanticipated consequences for the borrowed-from area.248
Despite these concerns, borrowing from First Amendment doctrine is particularly appropriate here for several independent reasons. First, the Court has
already borrowed extensively from equal protection doctrine in its First
Amendment cases. The Court has held that content-based restrictions on speech

245. "A person engages in borrowing when, in the course of trying to persuade someone to adopt a
reading of the Constitution, that person draws on one domain of constitutional knowledge in order
to interpret, bolster, or otherwise illuminate another domain." Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai,
ConstitutionalBorrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 (2010).
246. RA. V v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), provides an example of the incoherence that can be caused by borrowing. In R.A. V, Justice Scalia's majority opinion struck down a
hate speech ordinance on the ground that the law violated the Frst Amendment as an impermissible
content-based distinction within a category of unprotected speech. In reaching this conclusion,
the opinion borrowed concepts from equal protection doctrine to inform its interpretation of the
First Amendment in several ways. First, the opinion spoke repeatedly of "content discrimination,"
rather than "content-based distinctions." See, e.g., id at 388 (emphasis added). Framing the issue
as one of discrimination between types of speech allowed the Court to import the equal protection
concept that similarly situated people (or speech) must be treated the same. Because, for example,
the law punished race- or gender-based hate speech, but not hate speech directed at political
affiliation, it impermissibly discriminated against the latter speech. The incoherence comes in
RA. V's result. In order to comply with RA. V's holding, the government must punish all
expression falling within a category of unprotected speech or none at all. Thus, A. V's borrowing of
equal protection concepts created a doctrine under which more speech must be restricted, contrary
to prior doctrine and one's First Amendment intuitions. See id at 401 (White, J., concurring)
(stating that under the majority's reasoning, "[s]hould the government want to criminalize certain
fighting words, the Court now requires it to criminalize all fighting words," which is "at odds with
common sense and with our jurisprudence as well").
247. LA. V again provides an example. Having borrowed equal protection concepts, one would expect
the Court's analysis to rest almost entirely on the application of strict scrutiny, that is, whether the
law used narrowly tailored means in furtherance of a compelling government interest. The Court's
analysis instead rested almost entirely on the law's failure to meet any of a series of exceptions to
the requirement of content neutrality developed in prior First Amendment cases. When the
Court finally mentioned strict scrutiny, it did so cursorily in the last paragraph of the opinion. And,
as Justice White's concurrence noted, rather than actually applying strict scrutiny, the majority
opinion seemed to assume ex ante that "a narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass
constitutional muster if the object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a wider
category of speech. This appears to be a general renunciation of strict scrutiny review, a fundamental
tool of First Amendment analysis." Id at 404.
248. For a more detailed discussion of the risks of constitutional borrowing, see Tebbe & Tsai, supra
note 245, at 469-71.
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are to be analyzed using strict scrutiny, while content-neutral restrictions are to be
analyzed using intermediate scrutiny.24 9 Thus, applying First Amendment
principles to inform the colorblindness analysis would be following the channel
the Court's precedents have already carved, but in reverse. There is no apparent
reason why this channel should flow in only one direction. If equal protection
principles are useful in ascertaining when government discrimination against
certain speech violates the First Amendment, then First Amendment principles
can be equally useful in determining when the government's expression of
messages contradicting postracialism amounts to discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
Second, the Court has in fact already borrowed from the First
Amendment in at least two seminal equal protection cases. In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,250 Justice Powell's opinion relied heavily on
First Amendment principles of academic freedom in finding that the "the
attainment of a diverse student body ... is a constitutionally permissible goal for
an institution of higher education."25' The opinion stated that "[a]cademic
freedom . . . long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.
The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes
the selection of its student body."252 In Grutter v. Bollinger,253 the Court, citing
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, found that even under strict scrutiny, it owed
some degree of deference to the University of Michigan Law School's
consideration of race in admissions decisions. The Court reasoned that "the
Law School's educational judgment that [racial] diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer,"254 in light of universities' "expansive freedoms of speech and thought [grounded in the First Amendment]. "255
Accordingly, there is precedent for borrowing First Amendment principles to
inform equal protection doctrine. 256
249. See,e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002) (applying strict
scrutiny to a state law prohibiting candidates for judicial elections from announcing their views on
disputed legal or political issues); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
("[T]he most exacting scrutiny [applies] to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content . . . . In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny..(citations omitted)).
250. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
251. Id at 311-12.
252. Id at 312.

253. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
254. Id at 328.
255. Id at 329.
256. To be clear, I am not suggesting that government race consciousness outside of the university
context should enjoy the protections of academic freedom. Nor am I suggesting that, even in the
university context, state universities should be entitled to deference to make racially exclusionary
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Third, forthrightly incorporating First Amendment principles would
better reflect the reality of the Court's strict colorblindness jurisprudence. As
discussed throughout this Article, the Court's strict colorblindness cases are
explicitly grounded in the Court's condemnation of the message that it believes
race-conscious government action sends. The Court's cases condemn the
semiotics of the "appearances" 25 7 and "perception[s]" 258 created by government
"endorse[ment]" 259 of certain "message[s]." 260 Framing all instances of government color consciousness as a matter of discrimination obscures the fact that
the Court's underlying concern is with social meaning, not equal treatment.
The value and effect of government messages is a quintessential First
Amendment issue. 261
Fourth, a First Amendment perspective helps solve the riddle of standing
in the Court's strict colorblindness cases. If cases such as Shaw, Parents
Involved, or Ricc? 62 are reconceptualized as involving expressive harms rather
than unequal treatment, it becomes easier to understand the nature of standing
in those cases. Standing requires proof of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.263 The injury in fact in such cases, as this Article explains, cannot be
unequal treatment. However, in cases where the constitutional injury is expressive
harm, such as in free speech or Establishment Clause claims, the injury is the

decisions under the guise of academic freedom. Among other concerns, extending this idea to its
logical extreme would require a court to defer to a state university's judgment that refusing to
admit racial minorities would further its academic mission. Finally, I am not arguing here that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and the majority's opinion in Grutter necessarily struck the
correct balance between strict scrutiny and academic freedom. See, e.g., id at 362 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "under strict scrutiny, the Law School's assessment of the benefits of
racial discrimination .. are not entitled to any sort of deference, grounded in the First
Amendment or anywhere else"). My only point with regard to Grutter and Bakke is that they
provide precedent for borrowing First Amendment principles in equal protection cases.

257. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
258. Id
259. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. Shaw, 509 U.S. at648.
261. See, e.g., Norton & Citron, supra note 150, at 902 (arguing that, to the extent government speech
has value, that value "springs primarily from its capacity to inform the public of its governments
principles and priorities").
262. As previously noted, Ricci's holding technically involved only Title VII, not the Equal Protection
Clause. See Part I, supra, discussing the facts and reasoning of Ricci. If anything, the case for
standing under Title VII was even weaker than it would have been under equal protection, given
that Title VII explicitly requires that a plaintiff have suffered disparate treatment, which plaintiffs
in Ricci did not. See supra Part I.
263. See Lujan v.Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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government's failure to remain neutral on the subject matter in question.26
Thus, if Congress were to compel observance of Christianity as the official
religion of the United States, presumably standing would exist despite the fact
that all persons are being treated equally because all are compelled to worship.
Similarly, in the strict colorblindness cases, the Court has implicitly created a
rule of standing under which the injury is the government's failure to remain
neutral on the issue of racial inequality.265
Fifth, informing the colorblindness doctrine with First Amendment
principles would better accord with democratic self-governance. As currently
construed and applied by the Supreme Court, equal protection doctrine is
"difference-disrespecting."266 It finds no doctrinal relevance in underlying differences in government purposes or the social reality of the groups and individuals
affected by government action. 267 Thus, "[i]n attempting to be colorblind, the
judiciary often garners results that not only ignore the real disparities between
whites and blacks but evaluate blacks by implicitly white standards."268 An
example is the Court's application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications adopted
by a white majority to the benefit of a racial minority-that is, affirmative action
plans. Under the traditional justifications for strict scrutiny, such action would

264. See Hellman, supra note 54, at 42 (arguing that standing in these cases makes sense in light of the
nature of expressive violations: 'The state may not express that some people are less worthy than
others (Equal Protection) or that some religious beliefs are superior to others (Establishment
Clause). The violation is the failure by the state to comply with this prohibition; it does not require
that any person be harmed thereby.").
265. Viewing the Court's strict colorblindness cases as involving expressive harms is more sensible as
matter of standing than viewing them as involving unequal treatment, but it does not completely
resolve the issue of standing in those cases. For example, the lack of unequal treatment or tangible
injury calls into question whether the plaintiffs in those cases suffered the kind of particularized
harm necessary for standing. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), for example, the Court held
that parents of African American public school students lacked standing to challenge the IRS's
failure to terminate racially discriminatory private schools' tax-exempt status. The Court reasoned
that "the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination" was insufficient alone to confer
standing because "such injury accords a basis for standing only to those persons who are personally
denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct." Id at 755 (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). For further discussion of standing in equal protection cases
involving expressive harms, see generally Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and
Misunderstandingin Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998); Note, Expressive Harms
and Standing, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1999); see also Pildes & Niemi, supra note 38, at 513-16
(discussing the issue of standing in Shaw).
266. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE. L.J. 769, 830 (2002) (discussing various ways in which equal
protection doctrine manifests an "assimilationist bias" or disrespects difference).
267. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 741 (2007)
(plurality opinion) ("Our cases dearly reject the argument that motives affect the strict
scrutiny analysis.").
268. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias inEqual Protection:
The Visihility
Presumption and the Case of
"D~on't
Ask, Don't Tell,"
108 YALE L.. 485, 503 (1998).
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not trigger heightened judicial suspicion. When a numerical and electoral
majority that has not faced a history of subordination or stigmatization has
freely chosen to disadvantage itself for what it sees as a greater social good, that
majority is able to remedy its situation through the ballot box. There would
presumably be no need for a judicial check on the majoritarian process because
the self-disadvantaging group is the majority. 69 The Court, however, has held
that the Equal Protection Clause mandates "consistency: '[T]he standard of
on the race of those burdened
review [of race-conscious action] is not dependent
270
classification.'
or benefited by a particular
By contrast, First Amendment doctrine is understood to be "differencerespecting."271 It protects pluralism of opinion on contested matters of social
importance because it values the formulation of social policy through a
dialogic process.272 Thus, informing equal protection doctrine with First
Amendment principles in cases where the message of government race
consciousness is the predominant injury would allow room for the democratic
process to function. 2 n Indeed, a fundamental premise of the government

269.

270.
271.
272.

273.

Cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating
that "[i]f one aspect of the judiciary's role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect discrete
and insular minorities from majoritarian prejudice or indifference, some maintain that these
concerns are not implicated when the white majority places burdens upon itself," but rejecting that
argument on the facts of the case (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (first alteration in original)
(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
Yoshino, supra note 266, at 830.
See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the FirstAmendment, 32 WM. &MARY L. REV.
267, 281-82 (1991) ("The will of the community, in a democracy, is always created through a
running discussion between majority and minority. . . . [that] subjects the political and social order to
public opinion, which is the product of a dialogic communicative exchange open to all." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, current First Amendment doctrine values pluralism of
opinion so strongly that it protects hate speech, which scholars have suggested is more akin to an
assault than an opinion and therefore has little social value. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound A TortActionfor RacialInsults,Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
133 (1982).
This should be particularly important for those Justices who most stridently proclaim the
importance of judicial modesty and deference to legislatures. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's alleged countermajoritarianism and stating that "[t]his Court seems incapable of admitting that some
matters-any matters--are none of its business" (emphasis in original)); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The virtue of a democratic system with a First
Amendment ... is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the democratic
process and written into the Constitution."); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting) ("This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution [of the
debate about the morality of homosexuality] favored by the elite class from which the Members of
this institution are selected. .. .)
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speech doctrine is that when individuals' only objection is to the government's
message, their remedy lies in the political process, not the courts.274
Finally, a First Amendment understanding could help shift the Court's
analysis in such cases from platitudes aimed at ending the discussion2 75 to a substantive debate that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"27 6 regarding the role
race still plays in American society. Much like the government officials in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan"' who sought to use the law of libel to squelch
discussion of racial inequality,278 the Court's strict colorblindness doctrine shuts
down any substantive discussion of the propriety of the government acknowledgmg or correcting racial inequality. To be sure, there is a real debate to be had.
Even if one believes that racial disparities are real and substantial, many
questions remain as to what government action, if any, should follow from that
fact. The strict colorblindness doctrine inhibits that debate, falsely "level[ing]
the discursive playing field" by placing those who notice and seek to correct racial
inequities "in the same moral category as someone who consciously perpetuates
racial inequities.1"279

274. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) ("If the
citizenry objects [to a governmental message], newly elected officials later could espouse some
different or contrary position." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("When the government speaks, for instance
to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the
electorate and the political process for its advocacy.").
275. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(plurality opinion) ("The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race."); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006)
(Roberts, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(stating, in a vote dilution case, that "[i]t is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race");
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("In the
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.").
276. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

277. 376 U.S. 254.
278. In Sullivan, a public official in Montgomery, Alabama, sued private individuals and the New York
Times for publishing an advertisement soliciting funds for civil rights activities and for the legal
defense of Martin Luther King, Jr. The lawsuit alleged libel premised on inaccurate factual
statements in the advertisement, which criticized the segregationist and racist policies and actions
of Montgomery public officials. The Supreme Court held that, in order to protect the freedoms of
speech and of the press, a public official alleging libel over criticism of his official conduct must
prove that an allegedly defamatory statement was made with "actual malice-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id at 280
(internal quotation marks omitted).
279. Cho, supra note 3, at 1594-95; see also Barnes, Chemerinsky &Jones, supra note 3, at 976 (arguing
that postracialism and calls for absolute colorblindness in the law "allow[ ] those who oppose
affirmative action or the continuation of race-based remedies.. .to take the moral high ground;
they are the ones who have moved on to a new, more enlightened era, while those who are trying
to continue race-conscious remedies are mired in the past").
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Under the colorblindness doctrine, the Court need not engage the debate
beyond a search for race consciousness and the strident condemnation thereof.
The Court has embraced a kind of heckler's veto theory, long formally discredited in free speech jurisprudence, whereby the fact that government attention
to racial inequality offends some individuals or allegedly creates divisiveness is
sufficient to prohibit the message.28 Informing equal protection jurisprudence
with First Amendment principles, by contrast, would invoke a forthright
balancing of the competing visions of the common good embodied by
colorblindness versus remedial or diversifying color consciousness. Under this
approach, government officials could reject colorblindness and seek to promote
a message of positive color consciousness with the same vigor as the other
messages they promote in the public sphere, rather than disavowing or hiding
their antisubordination goals in order to avoid running afoul of the Court's
colorblindness doctrine.
CONCLUSION

The question of whether race still matters enough to justify government
intervention is subject to debate. I believe that it does. Admittedly, it is not
irrational to believe the opposite: that government attention to racial inequality is
a cure worse than the disease. But that is an opinion, not a legal doctrine; it is a
point of view masquerading as jurisprudence.281 Moreover, it is not a belief that
I am not using the term heckler's veto in a strict First Amendment sense, which involves the
concern that the government may silence a private speaker ostensibly to protect him or her from a
hostile audience. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN,JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsTAMENDMENT 140
(1965) (describing the concern about the heckler's veto as follows: "If the police can silence the
speaker, the law in effect acknowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by being hostile enough,
get the law to silence any speaker of whom they do not approve."). Here, of course, my concern is
not that the government will silence a private speaker due to a heckler's veto. Rather, it is that the
heckler's veto consists of the divisiveness that government attention to racial inequality allegedly
causes, which is sufficient to silence the government under the Court's colorblindness doctrine.
The anticipated reaction of a few operates to silence the many who have adopted such policies
through their democratically elected representatives, even where such policies cause no harm
beyond offense at the message expressed.
281. I am highly skeptical, both as a scholar and as an African American, that colorblindness accurately
describes the current state of either our minds or our society. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane,
Seeing Through Colorblindness:Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) (arguing
that scientific evidence from the field of implicit social cognition establishes that colorblindness as
a description of human behavior is empirically unsound); see also supra note 5 and accompanying
text (discussing continued racial disparities in the allocation of wealth, resources, and opportunities). I am also aware, however, that differences in cultural cognition may lead to different
views regarding the prevalence of racial discrimination and inequality. See, e g., The Cultural
Cognition Project at Yale Law School, httpi/www.culturalcognition.net (last visited July 24,
2011); see also Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed, A Nation of Co-wards?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at
280.
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the Constitution requires the elected branches of government to hold. The
Equal Protection Clause should not be interpreted to prevent democratically
accountable government entities from taking cognizance of racial inequality
simply because doing so expresses a message with which some Justices on the
Supreme Court disagree.

A21 (citing polling data revealing that "72 percent of whites thought that blacks overestimated the
amount of discrimination against them, while 82 percent of blacks thought that whites
underestimated the amount of discrimination against blacks").

